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UNDERSTANDING THE REVOLVING DOOR PHENOMENON 






As the Department of Defense (DOD) places increased emphasis on a smaller, 
skilled workforce, Human Capital and Social Capital (HC and SC) preservation become 
more important. The revolving door is an efficient but politically charged HC and SC 
preservation method. How are retired military second careers framed, and how should we 
understand them? What HC investments does the DOD make in officers, and what use is 
that investment to second-career employers? How large is the revolving door, and what 
can we learn by examining it in this officer group? 
This project uses DOD databases and previously gathered information to sample 
retired field grade officers and understand the revolving door. It recognizes the revolving 
door as an efficient way to maximize HC and SC return and the public perception as an 
unfair practice. Results indicate that the 30–40 percent recaptured retired officer HC 
tracks DOD civilian hiring trends and represents less than 2 percent of DOD new GS 
civilian hires annually. Retired officers tend to stay in their second career for at least 10 
years. The project concludes that rehiring retired officers allows the DOD to maintain its 
operational focus. It recommends policy-makers continue the revolving door practice 
with safeguards in place to maintain transparency, equity, and oversight. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................3 
C. PROJECT QUESTIONS...........................................................................4 
D. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................4 
E. ORGANIZATION .....................................................................................4 
F. PROJECT BENEFITS ..............................................................................5 
G. PROJECT FOCUS POPULATION .........................................................5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW: HOW RETIRED MILITARY SECOND 
CAREERS TEND TO BE FRAMED ...................................................................7 
A. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS: A GENEROUS PUBLIC AND 
DOUBLE-DIPPING AS A RETIREMENT ABUSE ..............................7 
1. Military Retirement: A Way-Too-Generous Defined 
Benefit Plan.....................................................................................7 
2. Second Career Ethical Failures ....................................................8 
3. Favoritism: Veteran Preference Rules .........................................9 
B. RETIREE PERCEPTIONS: REVOLVING DOOR AS A TOOL .....10 
1. Continued Service ........................................................................10 
2. Human Capital Leveraging .........................................................11 
3. Financial Incentive .......................................................................12 
C. CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CHANGING WITH THE 
TIMES .......................................................................................................12 
1. The Revolving Door and Punctuated Equilibrium ...................12 
2. Restoring Public Trust ................................................................17 
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE: WHAT NEGATIVE 
PERCEPTIONS OF DOUBLE-DIPPING AND THE REVOLVING 
DOOR GET WRONG .........................................................................................19 
A. HUMAN CAPITAL RETENTION AND REUSE ................................19 
1. General Human Capital ..............................................................19 
2. HC Investment Time, Timing, and Cost ....................................22 
3. Specific Human Capital ...............................................................31 
4. Social Capital/Networks ..............................................................32 
B. WHY FORMER MILITARY ARE WORTH MORE TO THE 
DOD THAN THEY ARE TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS ...............33 
1. Education ......................................................................................33 
2. Training ........................................................................................33 
 viii 
3. Experience ....................................................................................35 
4. Social Capital/Networks ..............................................................37 
5. Putting it All Together .................................................................37 
C. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES (MAPPING THE 
CONNECTIONS) ....................................................................................38 
1. Civilian Federal Positions............................................................38 
2. State and Local Government ......................................................41 
3. DOD Contractors .........................................................................43 
4. Private Sector Employment ........................................................46 
5. Entrepreneurs ..............................................................................47 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................49 
A. RETIREMENT DATA ANALYSIS .......................................................49 
1. Methodology .................................................................................49 
2. The Aging DOD Workforce ........................................................50 
3. How Retirees Impact DOD New Hire Needs .............................51 
4. Shrinking Return Time to DOD Second Careers .....................60 
B. SECOND CAREER DATA ANALYSIS ...............................................63 
1. Second Career Trends for Federal Career Fields .....................63 
2. Second Career Length Trends ....................................................66 
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................67 
A. FINDINGS ................................................................................................67 
B. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................68 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................................................71 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................71 
B. LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................71 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ....................................................72 
APPENDIX A.  MILITARY RETIREMENT DEFINED BENEFIT VALUE ..........75 
APPENDIX B.  RECAPTURING HC BY RANK AND YEAR ..................................81 
APPENDIX C.  SHORTENING RETIREE RETURN TIME ....................................83 
APPENDIX D.  AGE AND YEARS OF SERVICE TRENDS.....................................85 
APPENDIX E.  PERCENT OF RETIREES BY RANK ..............................................89 
 ix 
SUPPLEMENTAL.  EXCEL DATA DEPICTING 2006-2016 ARMY MID-
GRADE OFFICER RETIREES RE-EMPLOYMENT TRENDS ..................91 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................93 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Army Leader Development Strategy. Source: Department of the 
Army (2013)...............................................................................................20 
Figure 2. Army Leader Development Strategy Lines of Effort across the 
Institutional, Operational, and Self-Development Domains. Source: 
Department of the Army (2013). ...............................................................21 
Figure 3. DOD HCI across Minimum Officer Career. Adapted from 
Department of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014). ......................23 
Figure 4. DOD HCI across Average Officer Career. Adapted from Department 
of the Army (n.d.a.), (n.d.b.), (n.d.c.), (2014). ...........................................23 
Figure 5. DOD HCI across a Full-Length Officer Career. Adapted from 
Department of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014). ......................25 
Figure 6. Army Officer Grades, Ranks, Symbols, and Abbreviations. Source: 
U.S. Army (n.d.). .......................................................................................28 
Figure 7. Officer Promotion and Professional Military Education Timeline. 
Source: Department of the Army (2014). ..................................................28 
Figure 8. Army Acquisition Civilian Leadership-Technical Skills Framework. 
Source: Department of the Army (n.d.-b). .................................................35 
Figure 9. Civilian Contract Specialist Training Model. Source: Department of 
the Army (n.d.-b). ......................................................................................36 
Figure 10. Army Competency Cross-Map to NOAA Contract Specialist 
Position. Source: Contract Specialist, GS-1102-13/14 (2016). .................40 
Figure 11. Army Competency Cross-Map to City Risk Manager Position. 
Adapted from “Job Opportunities: Assistant Director—Risk 
Management” (n.d.) ...................................................................................42 
Figure 12. Military Officer to Defense Contractor Human Capital Connections. 
Adapted from Raytheon (2016b), Glassdoor (2016a). ...............................45 
Figure 13. Army Competency Cross-Map to Disney Supply Chain Engineer 
Manager Position. Adapted from “Disney Supply Chain Engineering 
Project Manager Position” (2016), Glassdoor (2016b). .............................47 
Figure 14. Retired Officer to Entrepreneur Competency Map. Adapted from 
Olien (2013). ..............................................................................................48 
 xii 
Figure 15. Percentage of DOD Workforce over Age 50. Adapted from DODa 
(2016). ........................................................................................................50 
Figure 16. O-4 – O-6 Returnees vs. Retirees. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). ............................................52 
Figure 17. Number of Officers Retiring by YOS. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). ............................................53 
Figure 18. HCR3 by YOS. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). ..........................................................54 
Figure 19. DOD Civilian Employment 2006–2015. Source: S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). ............................................55 
Figure 20. Army Human Capital Supply and Demand. Adapted from Defense 
Civilian Personnel Advisory Service (2015), S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). ..........................................................56 
Figure 21. Total O-4 – O-6 HC/SC Recapture Rate by Fiscal Year. Adapted 
from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ...........57 
Figure 22. Number of Army O-4 – O-6 Retirees Returning as GS Civilians or 
DOD Contractors. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). ..........................................................59 
Figure 23. Percentage of HC Recaptured by Time from Retirement (2006–
2016). Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication 
(October 12, 2016). ....................................................................................60 
Figure 24. HC Recaptured by Time from Retirement (2006–2016). Adapted 
from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ...........61 
Figure 25. Median Return Time in Days by Fiscal Year. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................62 
Figure 26. Percent of Returnees Returning within 180 Days. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................63 
Figure 27. 2006–2008 HCR3 Return Type. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). ............................................64 
Figure 28. 2014–2016 HCR3 Return Type. Adapted from S. Seggerman  
personal communication (October 12, 2016). ............................................65 
Figure 29. Blended Retirement System Overview. Source: DOD (2016b). ...............79 
 xiii 
Figure 30. O-4 HCR3 by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). ..........................................................81 
Figure 31. O-5 HCR3 by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). ..........................................................81 
Figure 32. O-6 HCR3 by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). ..........................................................82 
Figure 33. O-4 Median Return Time (Days) by FY. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................83 
Figure 34. O-5 Median Return Time (Days) by FY. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................83 
Figure 35. O-6 Median Return Time (Days) by FY. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................84 
Figure 36. Retirees Returning to DOD before Separation Date by YOS. 
Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 
2016). .........................................................................................................85 
Figure 37. Retirees Returning to DOD before 180 Days by YOS. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ...................85 
Figure 38. Retirees Returning to DOD between 180 Days and 1 Year by YOS. 
Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 
2016). .........................................................................................................86 
Figure 39. Retirees Returning to DOD between 1 and 2 Years by YOS. Adapted 
from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ...........86 
Figure 40. Retirees Returning to DOD after 2 Years by YOS. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................87 
Figure 41. Percent of Returnees by Rank and Return Type in 2006. Adapted 
from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ...........89 
Figure 42. Percent of Returnees by Rank and Return Type in 2016. Adapted 
from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ...........89 
 
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Public Trust: Violation-Remedy Matrix. Source: Allen & Braun 
(2013). ........................................................................................................17 
Table 2. Education and Training Time in a Minimum and Average Officer 
Career. Adapted from Department of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), 
(n.d.-c), (2014). ..........................................................................................22 
Table 3. Education and Training Time in a Full Officer Career. Adapted from 
Department of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014). ......................24 
Table 4. Typical Officer Education Investment. Adapted from Department of 
the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014), and Roth (2014). ..................26 
Table 5. Typical Officer Training Investment. Adapted from Department of 
the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014), and Roth (2014). ..................27 
Table 6. Average Army Officer Career Pay at Minimum, Average, and 
Maximum Time Limits. Adapted from Roth (2014). ................................29 
Table 7. Combined Monetized Education, Training, and Experience Human 
Capital Investments Made by the DOD. Adapted from Roth (2014). .......30 
Table 8. Raytheon Job Fields Open to Veterans and Military Retirees. Source: 
Raytheon (2016b).......................................................................................43 
Table 9. Comparison of GS Civilian to DOD Contractor Returnees by Rank. 
Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 
2016). .........................................................................................................51 
Table 10. Percent of Officers Who Retire by YOS. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................53 
Table 11. Comparison of Army Civilian New Hires against O-4 – O-6s 
Returning to GS Civilian and DOD Contracting Positions. Adapted 
from Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service (2015), S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). ........................58 
Table 12. Basic Pay Multiplier for Current Military Retirement System. 
Adapted from “Military Compensation” (n.d.). .........................................75 
Table 13. Traditional Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. Adapted 
from DFAS (n.d.), “Military Compensation” (n.d.). .................................76 
 xvi 
Table 14. High-3 Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. Adapted 
from DFAS (n.d.), “Military Compensation” (n.d.). .................................77 
Table 15. CSB/REDUX Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. 
Adapted from DFAS (n.d.), “Military Compensation” (n.d.). ...................77 
Table 16. Blended Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. Adapted 
from DOD (2016b). ...................................................................................78 
 
 xvii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACS Advanced Civil Schooling 
AER Academic Evaluation Report 
AGEAR After Government Employment Advisory Repository 
ALDS Army Leader Development Strategy 
ALRM Army Leader Requirements Model 
AWC Army War College 
BAH Basic Allowance for Housing 
BAS Basic Allowance for Subsistence 
CGSC Command and General Staff College 
DCPAS Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service 
DLA Defense Logistics Agency 
DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOPMA Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 
EEF Encyclopedia of Ethical Failure 
GS General Schedule 
HC Human Capital 
HCI Human Capital Investment 
HCR3 Human Capital Recapture and Reuse Rate 
HCX Human Capital Exchange 
IGF Inherently Governmental Function 
ILE Intermediate Level Education 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
JIIM Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational 
LOE Line of Effort 
MERHC Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care 
MIC Military-Industrial Complex 
MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board 
NCOs Noncommissioned Officers 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
 xviii 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NPV Net Present Value 
OER Officer Evaluation Report 
PCS Permanent Change of Station 
PDE Personal-Event Data Environment 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
RIF Reduction in Force 
SC Social Capital 
TSP Thrift Savings Plan 




As early as 1961, the Department of Defense (DOD) worried about public 
perceptions of military retirees seeking second careers as DOD civilian employees (Read, 
2014). The revolving door, or more accurately, the Human Capital Recapture and Reuse 
Rate (HCR3) continues to be a third-rail issue in today’s military. Traditional public 
policy debates frame the revolving door as an abusive double-dipping practice that must 
be stopped. Critics frequently cite instances like the Boeing tanker scandal, which traded 
personal favors and private sector jobs in return for Air Force contracts (Branstetter, 
2005). Activist public policy groups use these scandals as a basis for recommending 
legislation to bar or delay military retirees from returning to the DOD as General 
Schedule (GS) civilians or DOD contractors.  
Reliable data for this project was difficult to obtain. The project relies on data sets 
that potentially contained Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The authors spent a 
great amount of time and effort to eliminate any possible PII encounters. The project 
required legal review and Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval as non-human 
subjects research. Databases contained multiple data entries which required careful and 
time-consuming scrutiny to ensure data accuracy. Other federal agencies as well as state 
and local governments do not maintain retired military workforce data in a manner that 
was useful to the research team. Researchers were limited to studying the revolving door 
effects within DOD as a result. 
This project explores HCR3 in the DOD from 2006 to 2016. It looks at mid-grade 
(O-4 to O-6) officer retirement and corresponding civilian hiring data from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center to understand the HCR3 from a public policy perspective. These 
officers possess significant human capital (HC) and social capital (SC) by the time they 
retire. They also tend to retire from the military during their peak earning years and 
engage in some form of second career. This MBA report attempts to gauge the revolving 
door rate and its effect on the DOD’s efforts to preserve human and social capital. 
This project seeks to answer the following questions: 
 xx 
• How do retired military second careers tend to be framed in public 
discourse, and how should we understand them?  
• What recognizable HC investments does the DOD make over the 
course of a typical officer career, and what use is the DOD HC 
investment to second career employers?  
• How large is the revolving door effect for O-4 to O-6 officers, and 
what specifically can be learned about it by examining it for this 
officer group? 
As the DOD places an increased emphasis on maintaining a smaller, more highly 
skilled workforce, the revolving door and resulting HC and SC preservation will become 
more important and relevant. This project uses previously gathered information and 
statistical analysis of DOD databases to gather a representative sample of retired Army 
officers in paygrades O-4 through O-6 that have reentered federal service through the 
revolving door. This research attempts to accurately describe the “revolving door” 
phenomenon and describe its effect on HC investment. The intent is to understand the 
phenomenon from a public policy lens. It recognizes the value of the revolving door as a 
positive and efficient way for the DOD to maximize its HC and SC investments for a 
longer time period. It also recognizes the costs of the revolving door in the potential 
negative and deceitful practices that can come with hiring military retirees. 
As indicated in Figure 1, the retired O-4 to O-6 Army officer HC preservation 
attributed to the revolving door varied between 28.37% and 48.41% from 2006 to 2016 
(S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). At first glance this rate 
seems to have a great degree of variation. Some policy analysts may conclude that at the 
height of the Iraq and Afghanistan surges, retirees took advantage of their status to obtain 
lucrative second careers. It appears that the “good old boy” system may well be alive and 
functioning well. Policy analysts may argue that the large influx of recent retirees is 
therefore preventing highly qualified civilians from upward mobility in the DOD. They 
may also argue that the DOD is using unfair hiring practices to unfairly benefit veterans 
and retirees. When viewed independently, this perception may be understandable.  
However, the HCR3 is compared against civilian new hire trends during the same 
timeframe, a different pattern emerges. 
 xxi 
 
Figure 1. DOD HCR3 by FY and Recapture Type. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
The DOD HCR3 has a .93 correlation factor to civilian hiring trends in the DOD. 
Thus, the HCR3 tracks the Army civilian new hires illustrated in Figure 2 each year with 
little variation in that timeframe. Army O-4 to O-6 retirees make up an average of 1.93% 
of Army civilian new hires each year (DOD, 2016). When viewed against total Army 
retirees and civilian new hire numbers, the O-4 to O-6 HCR3 is limited. This suggests 
that, contrary to popular belief, there may be no significant revolving door problem in the 
DOD. The problem may lie in misperceptions about the value of Human Capital (HC) 
and Social Capital (SC) recapture and reuse. Instead of the revolving door being an 
abusive practice, maybe it is actually an underutilized and valuable tool for the DOD to 
maintain its competitive edge in national defense? 
 xxii 
 
Figure 2. Army Human Capital Supply and Demand. Adapted from S. 
Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
It is entirely possible that the DOD and public policy experts have not considered 
the full benefit of rehiring highly qualified military retirees in order to preserve the 
organizational effectiveness through carefully executed HC and SC recapture and reuse. 
The inherent value of SC to both the individual retiree and the losing organization may be 
overlooked when evaluating the effectiveness and value of maintaining the revolving 
door. Current initiatives to reduce or eliminate the revolving door may inadvertently 
cause the DOD to experience a greater HC crisis than necessary as the baby boom 
generation nears retirement and the DOD seeks to fill critical knowledge gaps. 
This project recommends that policy-makers continue the revolving door practice 
and maintain the immediate return practice. Current practices to rehire retired officers 
immediately after they retire or while on terminal leave realizes a 30–40% HC recapture 
rate (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). However, policy-
makers need to balance this approach with safeguards in place to maintain transparency, 
equity, and oversight. To maintain equity, the immediate return practice should be 
modified to ensure retirees cannot start their new position until after terminal leave ends. 
 xxiii 
Retirees should also be subject to the same hiring standards as their civilian counterparts. 
Programs such as the After Government Employment Advisory Repository (AGEAR), 
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This chapter introduces the reader to the DOD need to maximize its human capital 
(HC) investments. It outlines the project purpose, its central questions, methodology, 
organization, benefits, and its focus population. The reader will be introduced to the basic 
framework used to study the revolving door phenomenon.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DOD) and each military service invest heavily in 
their service members. Officers, in particular, receive large human capital (HC) 
investments throughout their service. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps 
train and educate their officers across a vast array of career fields. The education and 
training investment differs between service and career specialties. Officers who reach the 
minimum 20-year retirement eligibility also obtain a large amount of on-the-job 
experience in a variety of working assignments. They serve in leadership, supporting 
staff, advisory, mentor, technical expertise, and general administration roles across their 
careers. They gain experience in interpersonal communication, employer–employee 
relations, performance evaluation, situation assessment, and planning for unforeseen or 
upcoming events. These experiences enhance an officer’s knowledge and skill base and 
prepare him or her for future assignments with increased levels of responsibility and 
complexity.  
Officers build significant professional and social networks over the course of their 
careers. Social Capital (SC) increases an officer’s access to information and influence 
across the DOD. Even after officers retire, their influence can be felt through the 
relationships they built while serving. Many senior officers are hired by the DOD to serve 
as mentors to a new generation of leaders. This practice can be valuable, but it can also 
call into question DOD hiring practices (Gates, 2010).  
Careers in the military can be significantly shorter than in the civilian world. The 
average military service length is under 10 years (Segal & Segal, 2004). Only about 17% 
of all military members reach the 20-year retirement requirement (Segal & Segal, 2004). 
 2 
According to RAND, approximately 15.7% of the enlisted force and 54% of the officer 
force serves until at least 20 years of service (Dahlman, 2007). The short 20-year career 
and up-or-out promotion system make continued personnel investment costly to the 
DOD.  
With a short timeframe to recoup its investment, the DOD constantly faces the 
threat of an HC deficit. As a government agency, the DOD is bound by public policy to 
invest in HC and SC to meet growing and changing demands. To do this, the DOD 
models its officer development according to Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 
(DOPMA) prescriptions and other legislation (Rostker, Thie, Lacy, Kawata, & Purnell, 
1993).  
Like the rest of the federal government, the DOD civilian workforce is aging. 
Forty-five percent of the civilian workforce across the federal government is over 50 
(“Office of Personnel Management [OPM],” 2016). Likewise, the OPM also reports that 
46.46% of the DOD civilian workforce is over 50. To complicate matters, the average 
age for a DOD civilian to retire was 61.16 in 2015 (Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory 
Service, 2015). This means that 46% of the DOD civilian workforce may retire within the 
next 11 years. Managing this challenge has become a significant priority to strategic 
leaders. Most officers who retire do so in the O-4 to O-6 pay grades after a minimum of 
20 years of service. On average, officers retire at 47.9 years of age with 23.6 years of 
service (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2016). Retirees offer the DOD an immediate labor 
pool with experience, knowledge, and a valuable social network. In 2015 alone, 8,474 O-
4 to O-6 officers retired from the military (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2016). That same 
year, 22,911 civilians retired from the DOD (Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory 
Service, 2015). Maximizing retiree re-hiring can give the DOD access to an experienced 
and talented labor force and help delay or minimize the pending DOD retirement crisis. 
Many mid-grade retired military officers pursue a second career after they retire 
from the military. Their experience, talent, and professional networks make them sought 
after in both the public and private sectors, which creates an opportunity to capitalize on 
their HC and SC. Some retirees seek a career along the same line of work they retired 
from, while others venture out into new territory.  
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The DOD can leverage its HC and SC investments by re-hiring retired mid-grade 
military officers as civilians or DOD contractors after they retire. Veteran hiring 
preferences across the DOD and the federal government, along with veteran hiring 
initiatives across industry, have helped many military retirees transition to new careers in 
the civilian world. This practice of re-hiring retirees is referred to as the revolving door 
phenomenon. 
Anecdotal stories of unethical conduct by revolving door military retirees have 
created a stigma about the revolving door (Rein, 2016a). In some instances, these stories 
contain an element of truth (DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2016). However, they 
may not be representative of the revolving door population as a whole and undermine the 
value of the revolving door to the DOD because they only highlight the costs of the 
revolving door without recognizing its benefits. Isolated inappropriate conduct has the 
potential to adversely affect public perceptions about the revolving door, leading the 
public and perhaps lawmakers to misunderstand this phenomenon. This project addresses 
these issues.   
B. PURPOSE 
This MBA project attempts to identify post-military career path trends for officers 
who retired in grades O-4 through O-6. These officers possess significant HC and SC. 
They typically retire from the military during their peak earning years and attempt to 
engage in some form of second career. This MBA report attempts to gauge the revolving 
door rate and its effect on the DOD’s efforts to preserve human and social capital. 
As the DOD places an increased emphasis on maintaining a smaller, more highly 
skilled workforce, the revolving door and resulting HC and SC preservation will become 
more important and relevant. This project uses previously gathered information and 
statistical analysis of DOD databases to gather a representative sample of retired officers 
O-4 through O-6 that have reentered federal service through the revolving door. This 
research attempts to accurately describe the “revolving door” phenomenon and describe 
its effect on HC investment. The intent is to understand the phenomenon from a public 
policy lens. It recognizes the value of the revolving door as a positive and efficient way 
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for the DOD to maximize its HC and SC investments for a longer time period. It also 
recognizes the costs of the revolving door in the potential negative and deceitful practices 
that can come with hiring military retirees. 
C. PROJECT QUESTIONS 
This project attempts to answer the following questions: 
• How do retired military second careers tend to be framed in public 
discourse, and how should we understand them?  
• What recognizable HC investments does the DOD make over the 
course of a typical officer career, and what use is the DOD HC 
investment to second career employers?  
• How large is the revolving door effect for O-4 to O-6 officers, and 
what specifically can we learn about it by examining it for this 
officer group? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This report uses descriptive analysis to illustrate the current mid-grade officer 
revolving door size, shape, and impact on the DOD. It uses historical analysis from the 
2006 to 2016 period to show the revolving door effect for O-4 to O-6 officers. It 
describes the revolving door frameworks in terms of perceptions in the public and private 
sectors, as well as detailing officer career progression, retirements, and some aspects of 
DOD HC investments. Finally, it uses statistical analysis to demonstrate retired mid-
grade officer second career trends and to identify inferences that can be made about the 
usefulness of the revolving door impact on increasing the returns to DOD HC 
investments. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I is an overview of this MBA professional report and lays out the 
research roadmap. It provides broad-brush information to open the report and set the 
stage for readers. 
Chapter II details current military retirement plans and compares them to civilian 
retirement plan trends. It illustrates frameworks for revolving door perceptions in the 
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public and private sectors. It draws heavily from journals and news media sources to 
understand the public perception of the revolving door practice. It also draws from 
internal government reports to illustrate the perceived problems with and fixes to the 
revolving door. 
Chapter III describes the public policy perspective and outlines aspects of the 
generic and specific HC investment that the DOD makes in each officer. It highlights the 
HC and SC gained by organizations that hire retired military officers and details the 
investment amount that these organizations avoid by hiring experienced officers. It also 
maps some specific military and civilian HC connections to illustrate the value of hiring 
retired military officers. 
Chapter IV uses DOD databases to analyze mid-grade officer retirement trends. It 
analyzes the retiring mid-grade officer workforce and the revolving door return effect to 
the federal civilian workforce. It analyzes the average second career type and length to 
provide a level of understanding to the true size and shape of the revolving door for the 
federal civilian workforce 
Chapter V discusses project findings and draws conclusions from those findings. 
This chapter offers insights found from research results detailed in Chapter IV. 
Chapter VI proposes public policy recommendations. It also details project 
limitations and offers areas for future research.  
F. PROJECT BENEFITS 
The primary object of this project is to understand the nature and demographics of 
the revolving door phenomenon and its impact on DOD skills retention. Its secondary 
benefit is to reframe the revolving door from a negative double-dipping scenario to a 
positive tool to leverage prior DOD HC investments. 
G. PROJECT FOCUS POPULATION 
This research focuses on mid-grade retired Army officers. It did not look at trends 
in other services and did not include members of the reserve forces. It focuses 
specifically on the non-disability retired population. Army trends appeared to 
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approximate trends for other services during the 2006 to 2016 timeframe. The authors 
used Army data as a representative sample for DOD revolving door statistical trends. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW: HOW RETIRED MILITARY 
SECOND CAREERS TEND TO BE FRAMED 
This chapter explores the revolving door phenomenon from the perspectives of 
the public, military retirees, and Congress. These three frameworks provide an insight 
into the public policy debate surrounding the revolving door. 
A. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS: A GENEROUS PUBLIC AND DOUBLE-
DIPPING AS A RETIREMENT ABUSE 
Public perception often frames the revolving door as a negative practice. Civilians 
often frame military retirements as being unsustainable and out of touch with private 
sector expectations. They also look at highly publicized ethical failures and hiring 
preferences as barriers to civilian employee advancement. This section explores these 
issues in some depth. 
1. Military Retirement: A Way-Too-Generous Defined Benefit Plan 
The DOD Defined Benefit Retirement Plan looks increasingly generous and 
unsustainable in comparison to civilian sector retirement plans largely based on employee 
and employer contributions. As detailed in Appendix A, based on a discount factor of 
4%, under the Traditional, High-3, and REDUX Retirement Plans, a retiree can expect to 
receive a retirement valued from $1,015,800 to $2,496,352 with no required financial 
input from the service member. This is in stark contrast to typical civilian retirement 
plans, which increasingly do not include a Defined Benefit Plan. Instead they rely solely 
on employee contributions and employer matching funds to a 401(k) or 403(b) retirement 
savings account. 
In addition, service members are able to save up to $18,000 per year from their 
base pay in the Thrift Savings Plan (“Thrift Savings Plan [TSP],” 2016). If the service 
member makes the maximum contribution, he or she will add between $360,000 and 
$540,000 in a 401(k) type fund to add to their Defined Benefit Plan. This is in stark 
contrast to the average American, who may be offered an employee and employer 
contribution plan. By comparison, in 2016, the average baby boomer had $132,000, the 
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average Generation Xer had $61,000, and the average Millennial had $25,000 saved for 
retirement (Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, 2015). 
Finally, active duty military retirement plans begin payout immediately after 
retirement. Individuals as young as 38 may begin drawing a retirement check for the 
remainder of their life. This contrasts civilian retirement plans, where penalties apply for 
taking payouts before age 59½. For those who had the opportunity to join the military but 
declined, immediate retirement benefits for people who retire from the military seem 
extremely generous. This sense of retirement security for military retirees creates a 
degree of jealousy for military retirement benefits. 
2. Second Career Ethical Failures 
Stories abound wherein a military officer retires from service, gets a high-paying 
job with a defense contractor, and uses that position to influence military procurement 
dollars. One of the most famous cases of revolving door ethical failures was the Boeing 
tanker aircraft scandal in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this case, the second highest 
Air Force Acquisition official steered contracts and profits to Boeing in return for post-
government employment, money, and family favors (Branstetter, 2005). The tanker case 
is one of the most recognized DOD revolving door ethical failures. It is the “poster child” 
for second career abuses by DOD personnel. 
The DOD Encyclopedia of Ethical Failure (EEF) is updated annually and lists 
over 170 pages of ethical failures by DOD personnel or retired personnel. In one EEF-
cited event, a former lieutenant colonel, along with several active duty officers and 
civilians, conspired to rig construction bids so that a single contractor won continually. In 
exchange, they received money, cars, future employment offers, and other forms of 
compensation (DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2016, p. 87). In another situation, an 
officer who had been in charge of hospital contract award and administration retired and 
went to work for a hospital services contractor. That officer then submitted a proposal for 
the same services as a company representative, giving them an unfair advantage in 
procurement (DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2016, p. 148). 
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Newspaper headlines like “Veterans Caught Triple-Dipping on Benefits” from 
The Washington Times and blog posts by pension watchdogs do not help public 
perceptions of military retirees (Dinan, 2014). They contribute to a narrative that military 
retirees receive lavish benefits not available to the general public. According to one 
online forum regarding military retirees, two respondents had the following to say about 
their retired military coworkers during the 2013 sequestration furloughs: 
• There are several military retirees in my section, some officers. I 
think it’s kinda BS that they’re able to double dip like that. Since 
everyone flips out at the mention of changing military retirements, 
it would make sense to look at civilian retirement next. 
• The retired military guys in my office are actually enjoying the 
Furloughs b/c they have another fat check from Uncle Sam coming 
in. ... what do they care. These are the same guys that scoff at 
people getting welfare and other social programs, but take a hard 
look in the mirror b/c your abusing the system and your part of the 
problem. I know a guy tripple dipping ... collecting a disability 
check as well from the VA for sleep apnea. CLaims it was caused 
by the military ... maybe its caused bc your [sic] a fat slob and you 
dont take care of yourself ... but enjoy those 3 check your 
collecting [sic]. (“Eliminating Civilian Pensions,” n.d.) 
Perceptions such as these illustrate a general discontent with military retirees in the 
federal workforce by their non-retired civilian counterparts. 
3. Favoritism: Veteran Preference Rules 
Some federal and DOD civilian employees complain of improper hiring 
advantage for veterans and military retirees since they do not always undergo the same 
type of competitive hiring practices civilians undergo. Under the Veterans Recruitment 
Authority (VRA), veterans can be appointed to GS-11 or below positions without 
competition. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MPSB) noted that in FY2010, 5% of 
federal government external hires were executed under VRA. The percentage within the 
DOD was even higher at 7% (Read, 2014). In 2014, the MSPB reported that the VRA is 
an advantageous avenue to hire veterans quickly. The MPSB also noted that the VRA 
“offers so many opportunities for perceptions of improprieties—and those perceived 
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improprieties appear particularly serious because of the non-competitive nature of the 
authority” (Read, 2014, p. 17). 
B. RETIREE PERCEPTIONS: REVOLVING DOOR AS A TOOL 
Retirees view the revolving door from a much different perspective than the 
general civilian population. They tend to view the revolving door as a way to continue 
public service, leverage their HC, and pursue a full second career. This section explores 
the revolving door from the perspective of military retirees.  
1. Continued Service 
Military retirees have spent at least two decades of their working life serving the 
public. Some may wish to continue serving the United States in a civilian capacity.  
This project could not locate a significant amount of readily available recent exit 
data for military retirees from reliable sources. In the 2014 Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) Status of Forces survey to active duty members, only 10% of O-4 to O-6 
respondents answered questions about their plans after retiring. The 10% that did respond 
in the DMDC survey indicated that 19% of O-4 to O-6 respondents planned to retire, 
20% planned to take extended time off before starting work or school, and 73% indicated 
that they planned on being employed full-time within six months of retiring (Defense 
Manpower Data Center [DMDC], 2014). 
A 2000 DMDC survey asked respondents about their reasons for joining the 
National Guard after active duty. Sixty-six percent of separating officers cited a desire to 
continue to serve the United States (Hoover, Randolph, Elig, & Klein, 2001). The 2000 
exit results do not elaborate on reasons for returning to federal service as a civilian. 
However, 8% indicated they intended to return to federal service as a civilian after they 
retired. A reasonable inference is that they desire to continue to serve. Mid-grade officer 
retirees have given 20 or more years of their lives in service. Some may simply desire to 
continue serving in any way they can because of the non-pecuniary benefits of serving 
(personal desire, family tradition, social prestige, and so on). 
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2. Human Capital Leveraging 
Many military retirees have DOD-specific and general skills that make them 
highly employable by the DOD after they retire. Acquisition officers have an intricate 
inside understanding of how the DOD develops and procures materiel solutions. Planning 
officers understand how the DOD executes the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) process. This knowledge and skill set is expensive and time-intensive 
to develop. It benefits the DOD to capitalize on these skills as much as possible to 
maintain its institutional knowledge base. At the same time, DOD retirees offer these 
skills with no additional training, therefore enabling the DOD to avoid training and 
education costs. 
Unlike other agencies, the DOD is legally barred from hiring retired military 
members for 180 days after their retirement date under 5 U.S.C. § 3326. However, since 
September 2001, this statute has not been in effect because of a presidential waiver due to 
a declared state of national emergency. This state of emergency has been renewed every 
year since its enactment in 2001. President Obama renewed the state of national 
emergency again in 2016 for an additional year (Obama, 2016). The 180-day retirement 
rule suspension has allowed the DOD to rehire retiring noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) and officers immediately to fill open positions. 
The 180-day waiting period, suspended by executive order since 2001, would be a 
disincentive for retirees to return to the DOD. With no cooling off period, retirees are 
better able to leverage their institutional knowledge and serve the DOD in a civilian 
capacity. They are able to use their existing social network to their performance 
advantage, also preserving institutional capability. They also remain knowledgeable in 
current DOD systems, trends, and procedures. By being immediately employable, a 
recent retiree can maintain his or her currency and relevancy as a DOD civilian. 
The cooling off period does not apply to other federal agencies. Chapter III details 
the HC other federal agencies can capture by hiring a recently retired officer. Retired 
officers have a working knowledge of federal bureaucracies as part of their HC. During 
their careers, officers become familiar with operating in a Joint, Interagency, 
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Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment. After retiring, their knowledge 
of the interconnected nature of the federal government bureaucracy is valuable to federal 
agencies. Officers are experienced leaders. Mid-grade officers acquire significant time in 
leadership roles seldom given to civilians with similar career timelines. By returning to 
the federal government, retired mid-grade officers are able to monetize the knowledge 
and leadership skills they have developed. 
3. Financial Incentive 
One significant financial incentive for military retirees is the 1999 pay cap 
elimination. Military retirees are no longer subject to any form of pay cap as a result of 
their continued service as a civil servant. Prior to 1999, retired service members saw their 
pay capped at the federal government Executive Level V limit. The 2016 Level V pay is 
$150,200 per year. Retired mid-grade officers may receive between $40,632 and $98,550 
per year in retirement alone.  
Veterans and retirees can currently be appointed to grades up to GS-15 in the 
DOD with no waiting period. From FY2002 to FY2012, over half of recent retirees who 
returned to the DOD were re-hired as civilians in the GS-11 to GS-15 pay bands. GS-14 
and GS-15 positions require approval at the Major Command (MACOM/MAJCOM) 
level (Read, 2014). Retirees can potentially command a starting salary from $51,811 to 
$102,646 in the GS-11 through GS-15 pay bands. If the pay cap were in place, a 30-year 
O-6 retiree who re-hires in the federal government as a GS-15 could potentially lose 
$50,996 per year in basic compensation alone. 
C. CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CHANGING WITH THE TIMES 
From time to time, Congress has modified public policy regarding military 
retirement and second career possibilities for military retirees within the federal 
government. This section explores the revolving door congressional perspective. 
1. The Revolving Door and Punctuated Equilibrium 
Trends in military retirement and the revolving door tend to move in one direction 
or another based on the national sentiment at the time. The military had no formal 
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retirement system until 1855 when the Navy instituted a policy to remove officers due to 
disability or other incapacitation (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, 2011). No formal retirement program was in place for enlisted personnel until 
1885, when Army and Marine Corps enlisted personnel could retire after 30 years of 
active service. Since 1855, the number of years required for military retirement has 
fluctuated from a high of 45 years in 1862 to a low of 15 years in 1935 (Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2011). 
At the same time, life expectancy has continued to grow. A person born in 1900 
could expect to live 49.24 years. That number grew across the 20th and early 21st 
centuries. In 2011, an individual could expect to live 78.71 years (Arias, 2015). An 
individual who retired from the military in the early years of military retirement could 
expect to live a much shorter life after retirement. Military retirement was designed to 
keep the force young and strong. Congress made consistent age limits a factor in military 
retirement from the start. Officers have historically been required to retire between the 
ages of 62 and 64 since 1855 (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
2011). However, retiring at a relatively young age meant many military retirees could 
seek second careers. Many of them would seek second careers in the federal government. 
To prevent violating the public trust, Congress enacted a series of laws designed to limit 
situations where military retirees, specifically officers, could enrich themselves at public 
expense. 
a. 1964 Move to Eliminate Unfair Double-Dipping 
The post–World War II Defense Department was a massive enterprise. From 1955 
to 1965, total DOD uniformed service members declined slightly from 2.9 million to 2.7 
million. Its civilian workforce during the same time declined slightly from 1.2 million to 
1 million. Although this seems like a reduction over time, DOD employment numbers 
were much higher than pre–World War II employment numbers. In 1938, with World 
War II on the horizon, the War Department employed only 163,457 civilians and 322,932 
uniformed service members (DMDC, 2001). Cold War commitments meant keeping a 
large standing military force that the United States had never needed before. Between 
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1955 and 1965, the total number of military retirees increased by 265.8% from 180,827 
to 480,563. As a subset, officers saw a slightly smaller increase of 221.7% from 87,323 to 
193,561 retirees (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2016). The large, long-term bureaucracy 
equated to a looming retirement boom. 
The first 20-year retirees from World War II were beginning to retire, and concern 
began to grow about second careers as contractors in the Military-Industrial Complex 
(MIC), as well as inappropriately acquired second civil service careers. As early as 1961, 
the DOD was worried about public perception of military retirees in the revolving door 
(Read, 2014). The DOD recognized the need to maintain HC in the MIC. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick issued a guidance memorandum in July 1961 
establishing rules for employing military retirees in the DOD. This memorandum 
instituted a six-month cooling off period for retirees to ensure the DOD was getting 
qualified applicants for positions, not just well-connected recent retirees, meaning those 
with significant SC (Read, 2014). 
In 1963, Congress held a series of hearings to modernize dual compensation and 
dual employment in the federal government. During the hearings, allegations surfaced of 
hostile work environments that favored military retirees, writing job descriptions so only 
retired military could apply, and eliminating civilian positions only to reinstate the 
position when the desired military members retired (Modernization of Dual-
Compensation and Dual-Employment Laws, 1963). At the same time, the hearing 
reiterated the need to retain and attract qualified military retirees to fill civilian positions. 
The DOD needed a careful balance between experienced retirees and career civil 
servants. 
After the 1963 modernization hearings, Congress echoed the Gilpatrick memo’s 
intent when they passed Appointments of Retired Members of the Armed Forces to 
Positions in the Department of Defense, Public Law No. 88-448 in 1964. Under this law, 
retiring officers had to wait 180 days before being employed by the DOD. They were also 
subject to a salary offset. Under the offset, they would receive the first $2,000 of their 
annual retired pay and see a 50% reduction in the remainder of their retirement while 
they were employed as civil servants. They were also subject to a pay cap in exchange for 
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a second career. Retired military members were restricted from earning more than Level 
V on the federal executive pay schedule (Appointments of Retired Members of the 
Armed Forces to Positions in the Department of Defense, 1964). When they retired from 
civil service, they were eligible to receive both full pensions. At the time, this was seen as 
a fair compromise between excluding retired officers from federal employment and 
unfair hiring practices favoring military retirees. 
b. 1990s Brain Drain and the Offset Elimination 
The content of PL 88-448 remained largely unchanged until the 1990s. Military 
retirees accepted the retirement offset and a pay cap in exchange for a second career as a 
civil servant. The federal government experienced a large exodus of military retirees 
without a corresponding influx of civil servants during the healthy 1990s economy. Many 
retirees would pass up opportunities to work for the federal government after retiring 
from the military in favor of private sector employment or entrepreneurship. In response, 
in 1999 President Clinton eliminated the salary offset and pay cap for retirees. Retirees 
could now receive their full military retirement while pursuing a second career as a civil 
servant (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 1999). 
Certain elements of Pub. L. No. 88-448 still applied to military retirees. Their 
civil servant career was considered a fresh start. Military service was not computed as 
time served for retirement purposes as a civilian. They would also not be able to use their 
veteran status to place themselves higher on an order of merit list to avoid Reduction in 
Force (RIF) actions (Appointments of Retired Members of the Armed Forces, 1964). The 
180-day cooling off period for the DOD was maintained. This move was supposed to 
increase the federal government’s ability to maintain civilian personnel employment 
levels in a healthy economy. 
c. 2001 and the 180-Day Cooling Off Period Elimination 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, changed the attitude toward re-hiring 
military retirees in the DOD. The department experienced rapid expansion in personnel 
and funding over its 1990s levels. It needed experienced people quickly. The 180-day 
restriction in 5 U.S.C. § 3326 was lifted in September 2001, allowing military retirees to 
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immediately return to the DOD as civilians. This allowed the DOD to grow its civilian 
force quickly to meet its mission requirements. However, it also began to bring back a 
general feeling among career civilians that military retirees had an unfair advantage in the 
post-9/11 DOD.  
According to the Merit Systems Protection Board, between September 2001 and 
January 2013, 41,630 military retirees returned to the DOD as civilians within 180 days 
of retirement. 51% of those retirees became reemployed by the DOD either before their 
official retirement or within 14 days of retirement (Read, 2014). This perception of 
military retiree entitlement grew to the point where the term “No Colonel Left Behind” 
entered the civilian workforce lexicon (Devadoss, 2014; Saynuk, 2016). Clearly, the 
DOD would have to address problems with its re-hiring of military retirees at some point 
in the future to address civilian workforce grievances. 
d. Current Second Career Initiatives 
In 2014, The Washington Times published a story detailing how President 
Obama’s veteran hiring initiatives were creating a division among federal workers. The 
story included allegations of hiring unqualified veterans instead of qualified non-veterans 
as part of the federal push to lower the veteran unemployment rate (Rein, 2016b). 
The 2014 Merit System Review Board report caused serious discussion within 
Congress about the state of hiring retirees in the DOD. The allegations of impropriety and 
the perceptions of favoritism caused a flurry of activity and follow-on articles by major 
news sources. The Merit System Review Board (MSRB) findings said that the “national 
emergency exception has essentially rendered the law meaningless in a post-9/11 world,” 
and “the delegation and re-delegation of the waiver may be contrary to Congress’ 
expressed intent and, when in use, may greatly weaken the law’s effectiveness” (Read, 
2014, p. 52). In June 2016, The Washington Times reported the U.S. Senate had voted to 
repeal the loophole that allowed military retirees to return to the DOD as civilians within 
180 days (Rein, 2016a).  
If signed into law, the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for FY2017 will end the 5 U.S.C. § 3326 provision that allows retirees to return 
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to the DOD within 180 days under a declared state of national emergency (S. Rep No 
114-255, 2016). The NDAA for FY2017 is currently pending review and has not been 
signed into law as of this writing. 
2. Restoring Public Trust 
Congress and the DOD are saddled with the task of restoring the public trust in 
the DOD. From the perspective of DOD civilians, watchdog groups, and Congress, many 
military retirees have breached the public trust. Table 1 illustrates some steps Congress 
and the DOD can take to remedy perceived trust violations by military retirees and retired 
mid-grade officers in particular. 
 Table 1.  Public Trust: Violation-Remedy Matrix. Source: 
Allen & Braun (2013). 
 
 
The MSRB report and recent news articles call into question all four elements of 
trust illustrated in Table 6. There may be legitimate claims of candidates who were 
denied or not allowed to compete for jobs in the federal government (the DOD in 
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particular) in favor of veterans and military retirees. Congress seems to be taking the first 
step to increase control over hiring and close the national state of emergency hiring 
loophole for retirees. If allegations of opportunistic behavior are true, as the MSRB 
survey indicates, the DOD should take steps to correct the behavior or invalidate it as an 
anomaly. If The Washington Times allegations of incompetent hires under veteran hiring 
initiatives are true, Congress and the DOD are taking the first steps to address the issue. 
The theme of improper veteran and retiree hiring seems to be repeating across decades. 
The same opportunistic hiring behaviors scrutinized in the 1960s seem to be under 
scrutiny today. 
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III. THE PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE: WHAT NEGATIVE 
PERCEPTIONS OF DOUBLE-DIPPING AND THE REVOLVING 
DOOR GET WRONG 
Contrary to popular public opinion, it is entirely possible the revolving door offers 
the DOD a benefit not considered in many public policy circles. By using the revolving 
door, the DOD has an opportunity to increase the return on its HC and SC investment. 
This section explores the inherent value of HC and SC retention and reuse. 
A. HUMAN CAPITAL RETENTION AND REUSE 
According to Liebowitz (2004), in his book Addressing the Human Capital Crisis 
in the Federal Government, the four essentials in a Human Capital Strategy are 
1. competency management, or what a workforce should know; 
2. performance management, or how to gauge workforce performance when 
judged against competencies; 
3. knowledge management, or managing institutional memory; and 
4. change management, or knowing how to change institutional culture to 
achieve the desired ends. (p. 48) 
The DOD capitalizes on the HC investment increases by placing officers in more 
complex roles with increasing responsibility levels. They are expected to have a more 
diverse range of competency and are rated against those competencies.  
Each service approaches officer HC in a slightly different manner. This project 
uses Army HC investment (HCI) as its point of reference for illustrative purposes. The 
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps make similar investments in their officers in order to 
accomplish their individual missions. 
1. General Human Capital 
The Army uses the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) illustrated in 
Figure 1 to develop its officer corps. The ALDS is how the Army addresses the four 
essentials in a Human Capital Strategy. 
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Figure 1.  Army Leader Development Strategy. Source: 
Department of the Army (2013). 
The ALDS reinforces the Army values, desired leadership attributes, skills, and 
actions in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. Under ALDS, 
competency is assessed in the institutional domain by using Academic Evaluation 
Reports (AERs). Performance is judged in the operational domain using Officer 
Evaluation Reports (OERs.) With these documents, an officer is judged against the 
attributes and competencies outlined in the Army Leader Requirements Model (ALRM). 
Officers are evaluated by their superiors on whether they meet the “Be, Know, Do” 
aspects of the ALRM as detailed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Army Leader Development Strategy Lines of Effort across the 
Institutional, Operational, and Self-Development Domains. Source: 
Department of the Army (2013). 
The Army manages institutional memory by sending officers from the operational 
domain to the institutional domain at key points in their career. Officers can expect to 
attend the Captain’s Career Course (CCC) and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) as 
they gain rank and experience. Their experiences leading platoons is reinforced at these 
schools. The individual gains tactical and organizational skills while the Army gets the 
benefit of collecting and disseminating lessons learned in the field. The Army also 
encourages institutional memory building in the self-development domain. Officers are 
encouraged to seek additional knowledge and publish their findings in Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL) periodicals, Foreign Policy articles, and other locations. 
Change management can be a bit tricky. The DOD and the Army are risk-averse 
bureaucracies. They use risk mitigation techniques in every planning and execution 
aspect. Effecting change within institutional boundaries can be difficult. However, many 
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change agents are able to recognize situations and apply more novel approaches to solve 
them. This is where the self-development domain comes into play. Understanding what 
leaders in the past and in other organizations did to solve problems helps to reframe 
organizational needs and solutions. 
2. HC Investment Time, Timing, and Cost 
The timing component of an officer’s education is an important factor in their 
career. An officer will spend several years in an education or training environment. Army 
officers who retire at the career minimum of 20 years spend approximately 23% of their 
career in an institutional setting receiving training or educational HCI. This does not 
include time they may spend in an instructor role at a military school or training facility. 
Those roles fall under the experience portion of the Institutional Domain. Table 2 details 
the HCI in terms of investment months and years for minimum and average 
officer careers.  
 Table 2.  Education and Training Time in a Minimum and Average Officer 




Education Type Time (mos) Time (yrs)
Master's Degree 18 1.5
ILE Education 4 0.33
Total 22 Months 1.83 Years
Training Type Time (mos) Time (yrs)
BOLC 6 0.5
CCC 6 0.5
ILE Training 6 0.5
Misc. Training 12 1
Total 30 Months 2.5 Years
Total Education 
and Training
Time (mos) Time (yrs)
Total Time 52 Months 4.33 Years
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Training and education investment remains the same for officers who elect to 
retire at the average 23.6 year point. However, the HCI time remains identical. This way, 
the DOD has recaptured more of its HCI in the Operational Domain through experience. 
Figures 3 and 4 detail how the experience portion has increased from 68% to 71% over 
the course of the officer’s career. 
 
Figure 3.  DOD HCI across Minimum Officer Career. Adapted from Department 
of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014). 
 
Figure 4.  DOD HCI across Average Officer Career. Adapted from Department 
of the Army (n.d.a.), (n.d.b.), (n.d.c.), (2014). 
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At approximately the average officer’s retirement point, many will be faced with 
the prospect of selection for the Army War College (AWC) and promotion to the O-6 pay 
grade. This represents the carrot that the Army dangles in front of an officer to remain in 
service. When they choose to remain in service, they will see an increase in education 
and training HCI and will be able to retire in a higher pay band with a higher multiplier 
percentage. Table 3 illustrates the training and education time an officer will experience 
across their career. 
 Table 3.  Education and Training Time in a Full Officer Career. Adapted 
from Department of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014). 
 
 
The Army receives more payback for officers that stay the additional time to 
reach the 30-year retirement point and have been promoted to O-6. As indicated by 
Figure 5, the experience portion of an officer’s career rises slightly from 71 to 72%. 
AWC represents the final formal Professional Military Education (PME) input by the 
Army during their professional career. Any additional HCI comes in the form of 
experience in the Operational Domain. They may have additional tours of duty in the 
Institutional Domain; however, those roles will typically be as a senior administrator, not 
as a student or trainee. 
Education Type Time (mos) Time (yrs)
Master's Degree 18 1.5
ILE Education 4 0.33
AWC Education 4.5 0.375
Total 26.5 Months 2.208 Years
Training Type Time (mos) Time (yrs)
BOLC 6 0.5
CCC 6 0.5
ILE Training 6 0.5
AWC Training 4.5 0.375
Misc. Training 12 1
Total 34.5 Months 2.875 Years
Total Education 
and Training
Time (mos) Time (yrs)
Total Time 61 Months 5.08 Years
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Figure 5.  DOD HCI across a Full-Length Officer Career. Adapted from 
Department of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014). 
As indicated by Figures 3, 4, and 5 and Tables 2 and 3, the DOD spends a great 
deal of time educating and training its officers to prepare them for the experiences they 
will encounter. They learn from their experiences as well, but those experiences are much 
harder to quantify than the education and training domains. 
a. Education 
As outlined in Table 4, the DOD spends a large amount of money to educate each 
officer. This education is timed to coincide with promotion and progression timelines to 
adequately fill the DOD’s personnel needs. Each additional education period normally 
involves a prescribed additional service length obligation in a carrot and stick approach to 
force structuring. 
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 Table 4.  Typical Officer Education Investment. Adapted from Department 
of the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014), and Roth (2014). 
 
Illustrates the education level normally expected for an officer in a career.  
Individual student load for ILE is $97,000 with 40% allocated to 
education and 60% allocated to training.  
Individual student load for AWC is $119,000 with 50% allocated to 
education and 50% allocated to training. 
Costs were derived from 2015 actual numbers given in the 2017 Army 
Budget Request Data Book.  
By the time an officer retires from the military, the DOD has typically sent him or her 
through at least one or more of the following: a master’s degree program, a fellowship, an 
exchange period with private industry, or professional military education in the form of 
ILE and/or AWC. By the end of a mid-grade officer’s career, the DOD has invested an 
approximate average of $500,000 in the officer’s education. 
b. Training 
As indicated by Table 5, by the time an officer retires, he or she will generally 
have gone through accession training, a basic instruction course, an advanced junior 
officer course, and a mid-grade officer course. Officers who are on track for promotion to 
O-6 can be selected for AWC. 
Civilian Education Average Cost Salary Cost Total Cost
Bachelor's Degree $47,816.18 0 $47,816.18
Master's Degree $33,932.23 $235,121.25 $269,053.48
Professional 
Military Education
Education Cost Salary Cost Total Cost
ILE $38,800.00 $57,991.33 $96,791.33
AWC $59,750.00 $76,618.88 $136,368.88
Investment Timeline Education Cost Salary Cost Total Cost
Minimum 20 Year 
Retired
$120,548.41 $293,112.58 $413,660.99
Average 23.6 Year 
Retired
$120,548.41 $293,112.58 $413,660.99




 Table 5.  Typical Officer Training Investment. Adapted from Department of 
the Army (n.d.-a), (n.d.-b), (n.d.-c), (2014), and Roth (2014). 
 
Illustrates the training level normally expected for an officer in a 
career.  
Individual student load for ILE is $97,000 with 40% allocated to 
education and 60% allocated to training.  
Individual student load for AWC is $119,000 with 50% allocated 
to education and 50% allocated to training. 
Costs were derived from 2015 actual numbers given in the 2017 
Army Budget Request Data Book.  
Each training opportunity is designed to build on the last and prepare officers to serve at 
the next higher level. By the time a mid-grade officer retires, the DOD will invest 
between $306,238 and $451,120 in training the officer for future assignments. 
c. Experience 
Officers generally hold a variety of leadership and administrative roles over the 
course of their career. While individual services may have a somewhat defined career 
path for each of their career fields, individual officer experiences can be quite different. 
Regardless of career field, each officer is subject to the same pay and benefits system. 
Because experience can be difficult to quantify, this MBA report used officer salaries as a 
way to approximate the experience HC investment component. 
Training Type Training Cost Salary Cost Total Cost
Accession $18,854.91 $17,371.45 $36,226.36
BOLC $6,690.08 $41,691.50 $48,381.58
CCC $6,683.13 $69,760.50 $76,443.63
ILE* $58,200.00 $86,987.00 $145,187.00
AWC** $59,750.00 $85,132.08 $144,882.08
Investment Timeline Training Cost Salary Cost Total Cost
20 Year Minimum 
Retired
$90,428.12 $215,810.45 $306,238.57
23.6 Year Average 
Retired
$90,428.12 $215,810.45 $306,238.57




Military careers follow a generally-prescribed promotion timeline. As depicted in 
Figures 6 and 7, over the course of a 20-year career, an officer who starts his or her career 
in the O-1 paygrade will complete it in the O-5 paygrade. Figure 6 depicts Army 
paygrade and rank equivalencies. An officer in the O-1 paygrade is a Second Lieutenant. 
An officer in the O-6 paygrade is a Colonel. Paygrades are used throughout this project to 
discuss the officer population within the Army and the DOD. 
 
Figure 6.  Army Officer Grades, Ranks, Symbols, and Abbreviations. Source: 
U.S. Army (n.d.). 
If the officer’s career stretches beyond the 20-year mark, he or she may retire as 
an O-6 up to the 30-year point. The typical career timeline for Army officers is depicted 
in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7.  Officer Promotion and Professional Military Education Timeline. 
Source: Department of the Army (2014). 
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As Table 6 illustrates, in today’s environment, an officer can expect to be 
promoted to the O-2 paygrade at approximately18 months, O-3 at approximately four 
years, O-4 at 11 years, O-5 at 18 years, and O-6 at 23 years of service. Promotion timing 
variations can occur based on individual performance and service requirements that can 
cause calculation adjustments. Average direct reimbursement rates on a per capita basis 
are calculated using the 2015 Military Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursement 
Rates from the Under Secretary of Defense (USD-Comptroller). The USD (Comptroller) 
data includes basic pay, retired pay accrual, Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), 
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), incentive and special pays, Permanent Change of 
Station (PCS) expense, miscellaneous expense, and Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health 
Care (MERHC) accrual to arrive at the composite rate (Roth, 2014). This project used 
these figures to determine personnel costs across an officer’s career as depicted in 
Table 6. 
 Table 6.  Average Army Officer Career Pay at Minimum, Average, and 























O-1 $83,383.00 $125,074.50 18 mos $125,074.50 18 mos $125,074.50 18 mos
O-2 $109,107.00 $272,767.50 2.5 yrs $272,767.50 2.5 yrs $272,767.50 2.5 yrs
O-3 $139,521.00 $976,647.00 7 yrs $976,647.00 7 yrs $976,647.00 7 yrs
O-4 $173,974.00 $1,217,818.00 7 yrs $1,217,818.00 7 yrs $1,217,818.00 7 yrs
O-5 $204,317.00 $408,634.00 2 yrs $1,140,769.92 5 yrs, 7 mos $1,021,585.00 5 yrs




$3,000,941.00 20 yrs $3,733,076.92
23 yrs, 7 
mos $5,324,769.00 30 yrs
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d. Putting it All Together 
The DOD makes a significant investment in each officer. As indicated in Table 7, 
the total quantifiable HCI can range from $3.5 to $6 million for each individual. This all-
inclusive approach is one way to frame officer HCI. Other methodologies may exist with 
different calculation factors. Regardless of the methodology chosen to depict officer HCI, 
the dollar amounts invested in each officer are large. 
 Table 7.  Combined Monetized Education, Training, and Experience Human 
Capital Investments Made by the DOD. Adapted from Roth (2014). 
 
 
The DOD continually makes this investment across the individual services. The expense 
seems extreme when considering the total number of officers across the DOD. However, 
this investment ensures that the DOD maintains an officer corps of highly educated, 



























3. Specific Human Capital 
Each service maintains its own set of individual officer qualification 
requirements. The Army trains its officers in a variety branches and functional areas to 
fill its operational requirements. Branches serve general warfighter requirements such as 
armor, infantry, logistics, and engineers. Functional areas give the Army specific skill 
sets for specific needs. Some examples of functional areas include acquisition, foreign 
area officers, public affairs, and strategists (Department of the Army, 2014).  
Both branches and functional areas make specific investments in developing 
officer HC. For example, armor officers are trained to coordinate moving mechanized 
formations and move to engage targets. Infantry officers are trained to coordinate large 
numbers of individual soldiers moving in different terrains. Logistics officers are trained 
to coordinate intermodal transportation. Engineers are trained in building and 
demolishing structures. Functional areas focus on specific skill sets. Acquisition officers 
are trained in program management and contract theory. Foreign area officers coordinate 
with the Department of State and are foreign military liaisons. Public affairs officers 
coordinate DOD actions and intent to civilian news media. Strategists develop high level 
plans and help craft public policy. 
The individual HCI for officers can become very focused over a career. For 
example, an Army officer who starts his or her career in a petroleum unit may gain more 
energy experience as his or her career progresses. The officer may attend the Junior 
Petroleum Officer Course and the follow-on Petroleum Officer Course. As the 20-year 
point approaches, the officer may find him or herself leading a fuel battalion. As his or 
her career continues, the officer may provide strategic guidance to the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) Energy Office. The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army all have 
specialties where they direct specific HCI. Each service incorporates its standards, 
training, and education methods in a slightly different fashion. This specific HCI helps 
the DOD fulfill its mission requirements. 
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4. Social Capital/Networks 
The saying “it’s not what you know, it’s who you know” becomes more relevant 
as officers progress in their careers. This saying alludes to the importance of social 
networks in promotion and progression. As an example, one co-author of this MBA 
report was hired for a position in a new organization because the hiring commander knew 
and contacted one of his previous bosses, who recommended him for the position. As 
officers are promoted in the DOD hierarchy, there are fewer people in their peer group. 
Their social circle gets smaller, but the influence of that circle grows as the peer group 
leads larger and more complex organizations. With a simple phone call to a friend, an O-
6 can accomplish in hours or days something which might require an O-3 several weeks 
to accomplish by going through official bureaucratic channels. 
The term Social Capital (SC) refers to the value generated by social networks 
(“About Social Capital,” n.d.). The network becomes more valuable to the organization 
and to individuals as they become more senior or their systems more complex. They are 
able to rely on their friends and contacts for expertise and advice, increasing information 
flow and reducing transaction costs to the organization (Smith & Lin, 2001). In turn, they 
offer their expertise and advice to their friends, who leverage their expertise to enhance 
their organization. The contact network they built enhances the capabilities of the 
organizations they work for by cutting red tape and increasing efficiency. 
By the time an officer retires, their contact list has grown significantly from when 
they entered service as an O-1. When an officer enters service, they build bonds with 
their fellow lieutenants and ensigns and are able to exercise their SC across smaller 
organizations such as platoons and companies. When they retire as an O-4, O-5, or O-6, 
officers may have considerable influence across several organizations. They may have 
influence across battalion, brigade, or division levels depending on their position, 
reputation, and personal social network. 
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B. WHY FORMER MILITARY ARE WORTH MORE TO THE DOD THAN 
THEY ARE TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
Receiving entities benefit from the $3 to $5.3 million in DOD experience 
investment alone when they hire retired mid-grade officers. Receiving entities also 
benefit from additional DOD capital investment in the form of partially or fully funded 
advanced degrees and training seminars. In total, when an employer hires a retired mid-
grade officer, they receive an individual who has received high degrees of education and 
training as well as 20 to 30 years of leadership experience. 
1. Education 
Receiving entities benefit from the education which the DOD pays for across an 
officer’s career. Officers are required to hold at least a bachelor’s degree by the time they 
are promoted to the O-3 paygrade (Department of the Army, n.d.-a). Approximately 40% 
of active duty officers hold a master’s degree, and the percentage climbs as service length 
increases (DOD, n.d.-a). By hiring a mid-grade retired officer, organizations receive an 
individual who has been taught to be a critical thinker and who can focus on their job 
responsibilities instead of pursuing an advanced degree. This gives them an individual 
who has been exposed to a wide range of educational experience across several 
disciplines including leadership, ethics, business, administration, and economics. Even 
though a retiring officer may come to an organization with 20 to 30 years of experience, 
he or she likely have undergone some form of education within the previous five years. 
This is in contrast to many in the civilian workforce, who may enter federal service with 
a bachelor’s degree but need to pursue additional education to further their professional 
career. They may require additional DOD tuition assistance or student loan repayment 
programs to advance. Retired mid-grade officers already possess an advanced degree and 
do not require additional DOD educational investment. 
2. Training 
Entities who hire retired officers receive a new employee who has been highly 
trained in a variety of areas. Retiring mid-grade officers undergo a wide variety of 
training scenarios. They constantly forecast requirements, plan upcoming events and 
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exercises, and run complex organizations in planned scenarios. Officers routinely train 
with other organizations, which requires communication, organizational skills, and an 
understanding of complex bureaucracies.  
For instance, the Army is the executive agent for petroleum management. The 
Army trains a small cadre of officers in petroleum management and distribution. They 
sometimes send some of these officers to work with major petroleum companies in the 
Training With Industry (TWI) program. In this year-long program, the officer gains 
valuable knowledge in petroleum pipeline distribution and management. The Army can 
capitalize on this training for several years to incorporate industry best practices. After 
the officer retires, they can bring that same training experience with them and increase 
the value of a private firm. Whether an officer goes back into civil service, works for 
state or local government, enters the private sector, or begins a new venture as an 
entrepreneur, the receiving entity gains dramatically from the training and specific HCI 
by the DOD. 
The Leadership-Technical Skills Framework in Figure 8 shows how the Army 
grows its civil servants to support the Army mission. This training model is used in 
conjunction with the Army Civilian Leader Development Training Model depicted in 
Figure 9 to help groom civilians for leadership roles in the acquisition community. Other 
civilian career fields have similar progression models that dictate the training, education, 
and experience needed for progression. The important note in Figures 8 and 9 is that 




Figure 8.  Army Acquisition Civilian Leadership-Technical Skills Framework. 
Source: Department of the Army (n.d.-b). 
It is also important to note that officers are pushed to achieve career field 
certifications at a faster rate than their civilian counterparts. For example, officers enter 
the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) as senior captains or junior majors. They may serve 
in a variety of positions for approximately seven to nine years before being considered 
for O-5 battalion command. In order to be considered for battalion command in the AAC, 
an officer must be an Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) member and Level III Defense 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certified in at least one acquisition field. This is 
not required for civilian counterparts in the same timeframe. 
3. Experience 
Officers will have between 13.5 and 23.6 years of experience in a 20- to 30-year 
career. During this time, they are placed in leadership and management positions where 
they may not be the subject matter expert. They learn to rely on other people and 
coordinate across many organizations to complete their mission. They deal with 
managing their subordinates, peers, and superiors on a daily basis. They have to direct 
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their subordinates even in cases where the subordinate knows more than they do. They 
have to coordinate with their peers and get along with others to maintain a working 
organization. They have to manage their boss’s expectations and solve their boss’s 
problems before he or she is even aware there are issues. 
DOD officer professional management emphasizes leadership while DOD civilian 
professional development focuses on technical expertise. Officers are placed in 
leadership positions for much of their careers. In contrast, their civilian federal service 
counterparts are brought into leadership positions slowly. Civil servant contract 
specialists follow the career progression model outlined in Figure 9. Civil servants may 
choose to stay in technical positions for their entire career and not pursue leadership 
roles. 
 
Figure 9.  Civilian Contract Specialist Training Model. Source: 
Department of the Army (n.d.-b). 
Retired mid-grade officers bring this experience to any future employer. 
Employers receive an individual who has years of managerial and leadership experience. 
They do not have to invest the time and money to develop these skills from within the 
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organization. The retired officer can also offer a fresh point of view that can help an 
organization define and achieve strategic goals. 
4. Social Capital/Networks 
Retired mid-grade officers bring a significant social network with them to a 
receiving agency. Officers build relationships within their career field, across their 
service, between services, across government agencies, and sometimes with private 
businesses while they are in uniform. By employing retired officers as civilians, the DOD 
is able to utilize their network and SC without having to rebuild the network with 
additional investment.  
An officer’s SC will be most valuable to the DOD and DOD contractors 
immediately after retirement. Both the DOD and DOD contractors can use an officer’s 
SC network to reduce their transaction costs and minimize the loss of that officer in the 
uniformed force. Officers who decide to enter the DOD contractor employment can give 
their new employer access to individuals who may be in positions of influence or power. 
This may give their new employer a competitive edge in government procurement. 
The officer’s SC and network may be less valuable to other receiving entities. A 
private sector business with no DOD affiliation may have little use for the benefits of an 
officer’s connections. The same is true of a state or local entity. These employers instead 
value an officer’s general leadership experience, education, and training. 
Entrepreneurial traits map well with general HC investment and resulting traits. 
However, an officer who pursues an entrepreneurial retirement can capitalize on his or 
her SC to maximize his or her own SC return as well if they launch an enterprise closely 
related to the DOD. New enterprises with little DOD applicability have less SC 
utilization. 
5. Putting it All Together 
Organizations may sometimes hesitate to hire retired mid-grade officers because 
they are concerned about whether they are a good fit for the organizational culture. 
However, prospective employers of mid-grade retired officers enjoy combined benefits of 
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highly-educated, highly-trained, and experienced individuals from the outset. They 
receive this with no investment on their part. The officer comes to them with education 
requirements complete. They come well trained. They come with decades of experience 
in leadership and supervisory positions. Retired officers offer employers a high degree of 
value. When the retired officer and the receiving organization match, the officer and the 
organization benefit. 
C. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES (MAPPING THE CONNECTIONS) 
Retired officers may seek second careers in the federal government, state and 
local governments, as DOD contractors, private sector employees, or entrepreneurs. This 
section illustrates the HC and SC components receiving entities can capitalize on when 
hiring a retired mid-grade military officer. The authors used Army officers and their 
general related HC and SC to represent DOD HC investment in each officer. Other 
services have similar skill sets and their retired officers would expect to have similar HC 
and SC mapping results.  
1. Civilian Federal Positions 
The 2000 DMDC exit survey found that 8% of retiring officers intended to return 
to federal service as a civilian (Hoover et al., 2001). As far back as 1977, the return rate is 
estimated to be similar, at approximately 12% to 15% (Causey, 1977). Federal civilian 
positions utilize many of the same skills and value the influencing, operating, and 
improving actions in roughly the same manner the DOD does.  
The accelerated rate for officer education, training, and experience leads to retired 
officers competing for higher level positions after retirement. Retiring officers who 
decide to reenter DOD service as a civilian are often hired into supervisory and 
leadership positions from GS-11 to GS-15. Between 2002 and 2012, 70% of retirees who 
returned to the DOD as civilians were hired in white-collar GS jobs; 52.3% of 180-day 
retirees during that same time were hired in the senior GS-11 to GS-15 positions (Read, 
2014). 
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Mid-grade AAC officers have generally completed requirements for Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Levels I, II, and III by the time they 
retire. They also have extensive leadership training and experiences. Because of this, 
many retiring AAC officers seek more senior acquisition and contracting positions 
compared to their civil servant counterparts who entered the acquisition career field at the 
same time.  
Figure 10 indicates the skills and attributes a retired mid-grade contracting officer 
can offer the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as a civilian 
GS-1102 contracting specialist. Similar positions are available in every department of the 
federal government that purchases supplies and services, including the DOD. In the case 
of a contract specialist, the most significant HCI transfer occurs in education, specialized 
training, and specialized roles. Acquisition officers are most likely to pursue this specific 
position. 
If the position were within the DOD or a specific service, a gaining organization 
would benefit from the retired officer’s SC as well as their HC. The retired officer in a 
highly technical field such as contracting would already know how the organization 
works and have an established social network. The organization as a team would function 
with minimal interruption if the retiring officer remained in place as a civilian with no 
interruption in service. 
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Figure 10.  Army Competency Cross-Map to NOAA Contract Specialist Position. 




 A 4-year course of study leading to a bachelor's degree, that 
included or was supplemented by at least 24 semester hours in 
any combination of the following fields: accounting, business, 
finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial 
management, marketing, quantitative methods, or 
organization and management.
Master's Degree Required Training:
ILE
Completion of all mandatory training prescribed by the 
Department of Commerce for progression to the GS-13 or 
higher level contracting positions or equivalent. DAWIA Level II 
or higher.
AWC Required Experience:
Training At least 4 years experience in contracting or related positions
Accession
At least 1 year experience must have been specialized 
experience; must have provided the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities to perform successfully the work of the position
BOLC Required Skills:
CCC
Conduct pre- and post-award functions on simplified and 
complex, multidisciplinary contracts and agreements in 
support of the mission responsibilities of the Division.
ILE
Manage assigned contracts, leases, grants, and interagency 
and cooperative agreements within NOAA and DoC;
AWC
Use a wide variety of cost and fixed-price contracts and multi-
year contracts;
Specialized Training Develop and/or review complex pricing arrangements;
Experience
Audit or review major acquisitions of similar complexity, 
present findings, recommend corrective actions and policy or 
procedure improvements; and/or
Command
Review, advise on, develop and recommend operating unit-
wide or agency-wide procurement processes and systems, 
procedures and policies or equivalent assignment;
Executive Officer
Conduct meetings with contractors on sensitive and/or 
acquisition related issues as an authoritative contractual 
representative when warranted
HR/Administration
Advise next level management on the status of procurement 










Duty Description: Contract Specialist, GS-1102-13/14, Boulder, CO; Silver Spring, MD; Kansas City, MO
Salary Range: $84,443 - $141,555 Annually
AGO acquires products and services and awards the financial assistance necessary to meet the mission and goals 
of NOAA. Through the award of contracts and grants, AGO administers more than half the NOAA outlay each 
year. AGO plans, designs and coordinates acquisition and grants standards, practices, and procedures for all 
NOAA offices and their subordinate entities. 
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2. State and Local Government 
State and local government bring their own unique requirements to the table for 
military retirees. The 2000 DMDC exit survey indicated that 7% of retiring officers 
intended to pursue a second career with state or local government (Hoover et al., 2001). 
Using the same basic “Be, Know, Do” framework, this project mapped officer HC to City 
of Houston job postings to illustrate commonalities. Figure 11 indicates some of the skills 
and attributes a retired mid-grade officer can offer city government. This mapping 
indicates that retiring mid-grade officers could be considered competitive for a $100,000 
position directly after retirement based on their individual experience, training, and 
education.  
As indicated in Figure 11, the general HC from training and education maps well 
to several desired qualifications in education, experience, and competencies, for the risk 
management position. The only significant qualification that an officer’s HCI may not 
incorporate is the desire to hire someone with a degree in occupational safety or safety 
technology. However, the experience gained in risk identification and mitigation 
throughout a career may help a retired mid-grade officer obtain a position with the City 
of Houston as an assistant director of risk management. 
State and local governments will be able to capitalize on the retiree HC but may 
have little use for the SC built by retired officers. The HC exchange that fostered 
organization cohesion in the military would not transfer easily to state or local 
government. This would not be the case if the hiring government agency is directly 
involved with military relations at a specific geographic location. The receiving agency 
could benefit more from a retired officer’s SC if they are geographically or 
organizationally close to the retired officer’s former military organization. 
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Figure 11 competencies were derived directly from a job posting on the City of Houston website. 
Figure 11.  Army Competency Cross-Map to City Risk Manager Position. 
Adapted from “Job Opportunities: Assistant Director—Risk 
Management” (n.d.) 
Education Linkages Minimum Educational Requirements
Bachelor's Degree
Bachelor's degree in Business Administration, Public 
Administration or a closely related field. 
Master's Degree Competencies
ILE
Have expertise in interpreting and applying safety regulations 
to ensure compliance and accident avoidance
AWC
Possess superior verbal and written communication skills with 
the ability to adapt style and tone according to situation and 
audience.
Training
Solid level of business acumen, ability to demonstrate a clear 
understanding of the integrated relationships across city 
departments
Accession Demonstrate a high level of planning and organizational skills
BOLC Exhibit a customer focused approach
CCC
Be highly self aware, recognizing the impact of approach and 
behaviors on peers, direct reports, customers and other 
internal and external stakeholders
ILE
Act as an excellent manager of people, skilled in motivation 
and team development
AWC
Must have proven experience in managing/directing programs 
with emphasis on Workers Compensation and Safety 
programs.
Specialized Training Minimum Experience Requirements
Experience
Seven years of administrative experience are required, with at 
least three of those years in a managerial capacity. A Master's 
degree may be substituted for two years of experience.
Command Preferences
Executive Officer
Self-motivated professionals with a degree in Occupation 
Safety or Safety Technology.
HR/Administration
Those with experience in safety, cost containment in workers 
compensation; program development and implementation in 
large organizations.
Intelligence
Applicants with a background and extensive familiarity in 
automated systems for injury prevention, injury analysis, 
managing claims, and proficient in PC software, preferably in 
spreadsheets, analytical, and word processing programs.
Operations
Professionals with a total of ten (10) years Risk 
Management, Safety and/or General Management 
experience.
Logistics
Candidates that are Certified Risk Managers or Associate in 







directs the management, planning, development, coordination, implementation, claim administration and operationEnsures compliance 
with all applicable Safety laws, current policies and programs while utilizing industry established best practices. Controls diverse activities of 
the City's Workers Compensation/Safety Program, including the third party administrator. Leads the development, design and 
implementation of Safety, Health and Worker's Compensation programs. The Assistant Director of Risk Management will be responsible 
for the success of the division to include the above as well as loss control, claims management, and loss prevention initiatives. This position 
will require a change agent who can identify barriers and lead corrective action while sustaining current performance and building future 
success.
Salary Range: $100,000 - $135,000 Annually
Duty Description: Assistant Director of Risk Management, Houston TX
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3. DOD Contractors 
DOD contractors are especially keen to capitalize on the HC investment made in 
veterans and military retirees. It can be reasonably expected that due to familiarity with 
the military culture, defense contractors would employ a large percentage of those 
seeking private firm employment. However, the federal government tracking database for 
ethics rulings, the After Government Employment Advisory Repository (AGEAR), is 
inadequate and ad hoc at best. Ethics rulings seem to be incomplete, and getting access is 
difficult (Amey, 2014).  
The 2000 exit survey is mute regarding specific industries that retirees plan on 
entering. However, 78% of respondents indicated they intended to pursue employment 
with a private firm (Hoover et al., 2001). Large defense contractor firms like Raytheon 
actively and proudly recruit from the veteran and military retiree base. Raytheon’s 
recruiting website has a specific site dedicated to hiring veterans and retirees. The site 
lists job openings in fields outlined in Table 8. 
 Table 8.  Raytheon Job Fields Open to Veterans and Military Retirees. 
















Raytheon capitalizes heavily on the training, education, and experience gained by 
retired officers to maintain its workforce. Experience dealing with DOD business 
procedures and culture are also points of interest for Raytheon and other defense 
contractors. Figure 12 maps the connections between DOD HC investment and the HC 
inputs Raytheon looked for in an advertised position opening for a logistics manager. 
Figure 12 indicates that officer general education and training HCI maps well to 
this position. Officer education levels tend to satisfy Raytheon’s education requirements 
for the position. Command experience, executive officer experience, planning 
experience, logistics training, and experience are the HCI components that map most 
readily. An officer with a background in logistics and planning would be competitive for 
this position. 
Raytheon would also be in a position to capitalize on the officer’s SC. The 
officer’s social network may help to maintain an effective working environment. It may 
help the officer cut through bureaucratic DOD red tape and increase section productivity. 
The HC exchange that enabled the retired officer and his or her former organization to 
succeed can be leveraged to foster a public–private partnership. All three parties benefit 
from hiring retired military officers. Raytheon receives an individual who can lower 
barriers to entry for federal procurement and business relations. The former organization 
benefits by having a trusted former member as their liaison to Raytheon. The retired 
officer benefits by being able to maintain links to their former organization and receive a 
paycheck from a source outside the federal government. Raytheon actively recruits 




Figure 12.  Military Officer to Defense Contractor Human Capital Connections. 
Adapted from Raytheon (2016b), Glassdoor (2016a). 
Competencies Linkages Competencies
Education Required Education:
Bachelor's Degree Bachelor Degree (B.S. or B.A) and a minimum of 6 years 
Master's Degree Desired Education:
ILE




Minimum 6 years related experience in Supply Chain domains 
such as logistics and inventory management
Accession
Experience working with DCMA, DCAA, internal/external 
customers, program managers, and all levels of management
BOLC
Experience facilitating and supporting DCMA and/or Customer 
audits
CCC Excellent verbal and written communication
ILE Excellent Organizational and Time Management
AWC Understanding of protocol in a defense company
Specialized Training Expanded Knowledge of FAR,DFAR requirements
Experience Knowledge of Inventory Control Processes
Command High level of analytical skills
Executive Officer Excellent interpersonal and customer service skills
HR/Administration
High level of competency in Microsoft Office, Excel, 
PowerPoint, Word, Visio, and Lotus Notes.
Intelligence Ability to work in a fast pace demanding environment
Operations Ability to travel
Logistics Ability to obtain DoD Secret Clearance
Planning
Experience and understanding of Government 
contracts/process & procedures
Communications Desired Skills:
Training Six Sigma Certification
Budget Experience in SAP systems
Community Relations Property Management experience
Specialized Roles Logisticians Certification
Existing DoD Secret Clearance
NPMA, CPPS and CPPA Certified 
Duty Description: Logistics Manager I, El Segundo, CA
Salary Range: $50,000 - $101,000 Annually
Manage Inventory Management team including supporting hiring, promotions, merit, discipline and reduction in 
force decisions; manage the department's Annual Operating Plan (AOP) inducing budgetary oversight; Ensure 
employees are actively managed in accordance with SAS strategies in areas of trust and respect, employee 
development, and communication. Resolving staffing/HR related issues; manage processes related to inventory 
located in the Consolidated Distribution Center, Receipt Corrections, ORR/IRR, surplus, transfers, contract 
closures, cycle inventories and ensure all is processed to service level agreements. Daily interface with the 
Warehouse Management and Warehouse team and resolve any issues or concerns regarding the inventory 
process. Monitor and distribute work load of all employees; manage monthly inventory financial reports; 
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4. Private Sector Employment 
Private sector employers like Disney also seek military retirees. Again, the 2000 
exit survey is mute regarding specific industry retirees plan on entering. However, 78% 
of respondents indicated they intended pursuing employment with a private firm (Hoover 
et al., 2001). It is reasonable to assume that a significant percentage of mid-grade officer 
retirees would seek employment with private sector firms like Disney and its affiliates. 
Disney launched its veterans hiring initiatives in 2004 and hires military veterans and 
retirees in a competitive manner.  
Figure 13 indicates that officer education and experience HCI maps well to this 
position. Training below the ILE level maps to a much lesser degree. Officer education 
levels tend to satisfy the Disney position’s education requirements. Command 
experience, executive officer experience, HR/administration experience, operations 
experience, and logistics training and experience are HCI components that map most 
readily. Officers may lack specific skills in computer programs that can be made up with 
additional classes at the officer’s discretion and expense. An officer with a background in 
logistics, planning, or IT would be competitive for this position. 
Unlike defense contractors, Disney benefits most from the HC investment in each 
officer. They are able to use the education, training, and general experience from each 
officer to bring new and different perspectives to their operational teams. They do not 
benefit from their accumulated SC since they do not do daily business with the DOD. 
They also do not benefit from the HC exchange that enabled the retired officer to succeed 
in their military assignments. Thus, an officer’s social network may not play a significant 




Figure 13.  Army Competency Cross-Map to Disney Supply Chain Engineer 
Manager Position. Adapted from “Disney Supply Chain Engineering 
Project Manager Position” (2016), Glassdoor (2016b). 
5. Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs follow a slightly different construct. Entrepreneurs take advantage 
of their education, training, and experience to start a venture and create something new. 




Bachelor’s degree in Supply Chain, Industrial Engineering, 
Computer Science or equivalent
Master's Degree Preferred Education
ILE
Master’s Degree in Supply Chain, Industrial Engineering, 
Computer Science or equivalent is a plus
AWC Basic Qualifications
Training
3 years minimum experience in Supply Chain Management or 
related field
Accession Experience managing projects
BOLC
Demonstrated expertise using data management tools 
(Access, SQL, JMP, and/or similar)
CCC Demonstrated ability to drive business results
ILE Excellent managerial, analytical, and communication skills
AWC Ability to partner and work effectively in a global environment
Specialized Training Experience with Visual Basic a plus
Experience Strong presentation skills
Command Excellent influencing and partnering skills
Executive Officer Preferred Qualifications
HR/Administration
5+ years experience in Supply Chain Management or related 
field
Intelligence Experience with programming languages a plus
Operations
Supply Chain certificates/continuing education (CSCMP, 
APICS, other) a plus







Duty Description: Supply Chain Engingeering Manager, Kissimmee, FL
Salary Range: $59,000 - $105,000 Annually
Supply Chain Engineering is responsible for identifying, developing and implementing supply chain strategies and 
cost savings initiatives for the Walt Disney Company.  Includes the facilitation and/or development of processes, 
tools and models that decrease total costs across the end to end supply chain while maintaining or increasing 
service levels.
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to start in an area they are familiar with. Logistics officers may start a trucking company. 
Computer engineers may become software developers. Procurement professionals may 
become contracting consultants. The 2000 exit survey indicates approximately 7% of 
officer retirees plan on pursuing an entrepreneurial future or joining a family business 
(Hoover et al., 2001). To illustrate the difference, this project used the leader 
characteristics, attributes, skills, and actions and compared them to entrepreneur 
competencies, as shown in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14.  Retired Officer to Entrepreneur Competency Map. 
Adapted from Olien (2013). 
Competencies Linkages Competencies




Selfless Service New Resource Skill
Honor Entrepreneurial Motives
Integrity Need for Achievement
Courage Locus of Control
Leader Attributes Goal Setting
Mental Self-Efficacy
Physical Entrepreneur Personal Effectiveness Competencies
Emotional Interpersonal Skills
Leader Skills Strong Initiative
Conceptual Ambition
Interpersonal Adaptability & Flexibility
Technical Willingness to Take Risks
Tactical Willingness to Learn
Influencing Entrepreneur Workplace Competencies
Communicating Creative Thinking
Decision-Making Networking
Motivating Planning and Organizing
Operating Problem Solving & Decision Making
Planning Checking, Examining, & Recording
Executing Business Fundamentals
Assessing Computer Applications
Improving Entrepreneur Industry Wide Competencies
Developing Principles of Entrepreneurship





Risk Assessment & Management
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter details specific data received from DMDC related to Army officer 
retirements from 2006 to 2016. The authors used Army retirements as an approximation 
for larger DOD revolving door trends. 
A. RETIREMENT DATA ANALYSIS 
For this project, the authors chose to look at the retiring Army O-4 to O-6 
population for three reasons. First, the O-4 to O-6 rank band represents the majority of 
officer retirees. Second, they tend to retire at an age where they can pursue a full second 
career after military retirement. Third, they represent mid-level organizational leaders 
instead of tactical or strategic leaders. The high degree of HC and SC each officer 
possesses when he or she retires at this rank band represents a significant opportunity for 
second-career employers. 
1. Methodology 
The authors requested specific information regarding O-4 to O-6 retirees from 
DMDC to assess the revolving door effect in the DOD workforce. The data set included 
20,503 active duty Army O-4 to O-6 retirees from 2006 to 2016. The file detailed non-
disabled retirees with 20 or more years of service. It also listed GS and DOD contractors 
hired from that population in the same timeframe. The DMDC data set included the 
following categories: Personnel Category Code, Begin Date, End Date, Separation Date, 
Rank, Fiscal Year, and Years of Service (S. Seggerman, personal communication, 
October 12, 2016). 
The authors also used open source information from the Defense Civilian 
Personnel Advisory Service (DCPAS) to look at the DOD workforce from a broader 
perspective. DCPAS information included the civilian workforce age distribution and 
new hires from 2006 to 2015. DCPAS information for FY2016 was not available at the 
time of this writing. 
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From 2006 to 2016, the Army retired an average of 1,864 O-4 to O-6 officers per 
year. Of those retirees, an average of 477 returned annually as GS civilians, and 234 
returned annually as DOD contractors. This equates to an average return rate of 25.7% 
for GS civilians and 12.6% for DOD contractors (S. Seggerman, personal 
communication, October 12, 2016). Data analysis focused on determining whether rank, 
years of service, or hiring trends were the primary drivers in the return rate. As we show, 
we determined that retired O-4 to O-6 rehiring trends closely approximated new hires 
rates in the DOD. 
2. The Aging DOD Workforce 
The baby boom generation is nearing retirement, and DOD civilian employment 
reflects the aging American workforce. The DOD workforce faces a retirement cliff 
within the next 10 to 15 years. In FY2015, 46.45% of the DOD workforce was over 50. 
As shown in Figure 15, the DOD workforce over 50 years old has increased more than 
7% from 2006 to 2015 (DODa, 2016). By 2025, those individuals will enter their most 
likely federal retirement years. As the workforce ages and retires, it will become 




Figure 15.  Percentage of DOD Workforce over Age 50. 
Adapted from DODa (2016). 
 51 
When new hires increased for the 2007 “Grow the Force Initiative” (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2008), the percentage of employees over 50 years old 
jumped nearly 4% in one year. This can be explained in part by the DOD hiring older 
workers in order to meet immediate staffing needs to support operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during their respective surge campaigns. During the initial stages of federal 
workforce downsizing following the 2008 recession, the number of new hires was 
reduced while older civilian employees continued government service. Figure 15 helps 
show the DOD’s looming challenge in retaining HC and SC to maintain its functionality. 
3. How Retirees Impact DOD New Hire Needs 
One possible way for the DOD to fill its civilian personnel needs is to recapture 
HC and SC by hiring military retirees. After spending 20 or more years in service, 
officers acquire detailed knowledge about how the DOD operates. They also develop 
valuable social networks that help maintain functional organizations. The authors looked 
to see whether rank, years of service, or DOD hiring trends had the largest impact on 
DOD HCR3. 
a. Does Rank Matter? 
As shown in Table 9, from 2006–2016, the DOD was only able to retain a small 
percentage of the retiring O-4 to O-6 population. The retention rate varies slightly by 
rank. A total of 34.56% of retired O-4s, 41.12% of retired O-5s, and 36.04% of retired O-
6s returned to federal service, this time as civilians, from 2006–2016. 
 Table 9.  Comparison of GS Civilian to DOD Contractor Returnees by 
Rank. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication 
(October 12, 2016). 
  O-4 O-5 O-6 
GS Civilian 23.35% 27.66% 23.91% 
DOD Contractor 11.22% 13.46% 12.13% 
These numbers reflect the percent of retirees by rank that return as either GS 
civilians or as DOD contractors. 
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Retired O-5s have a 5–6% higher return rate than other field grade officers. There are 
also a larger number of O-5 retirees. This leads to the retired O-5 population making up a 
larger percentage of both the GS and the DOD contractor workforce. If return rate were a 
factor of rank, the expectation would be for O-6s to return at a higher rate than O-5s or 
O-4s. With the information at hand, there does not appear to be a significant correlation 
between rank and HC/SC retention in the DOD at the O-4 to O-6 rank band. The data in 
Figure 16 and Table 9 appear to be consistent over the 11-year period. 
 
Comparison of the number of Army O-4 – O-6 retirees with 20+ years of service vs. those 
returning as either GS civilians or DOD contractors between 2006–2016 
Figure 16.  O-4 – O-6 Returnees vs. Retirees. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
However, Figure 16 and Table 9 fail to show civilian hiring trends over time. They also 
fail to show how the DOD has rehired fewer retirees year-over-year in conjunction with 
lower new hire numbers.  
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b. What Role Do Years of Service and Age Play? 
Officers tend to retire in greater numbers at the beginning years of their retirement 
eligibility. As indicated in Figure 17, the greatest number of officer retirements occurs at 
20 Years of Service (YOS; S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). 
 
Figure 17.  Number of Officers Retiring by YOS. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
As outlined in Table 10, 26.11% of O-4 to O-6 officers retire at 20 YOS. The percentage 
of officers who remain in service continues to drop until only 2.44% remain in service 
beyond 30 years (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). 
 Table 10.  Percent of Officers Who Retire by YOS. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
 
  
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31+
26.11% 12.42% 9.66% 7.55% 6.87% 6.53% 7.04% 5.23% 5.17% 3.35% 7.63% 2.44%
Officer Retirement Percentage by YOS
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There does not appear to be a significant trend between YOS and HCR3 with the 
exception of officers who retire at 20 YOS or 31+ YOS. Officers who retire at these two 
points do show slight indications of lower reemployment as GS civilians or DOD 
contractors within the DOD (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). 
Figure 18 illustrates HCR3 by YOS. 
 
Figure 18.  HCR3 by YOS. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication 
(October 12, 2016). 
Officers who retire at the 20-year mark display less tendency to return to federal service 
after retirement. These officers both retire and return in the greatest number. However, 
they return at a lower rate than officers who retire beyond 20 YOS. Officers retiring at 20 
YOS return 4.8% below the HCR3 median rate of 39.4%, indicating a lower tendency to 
stay in federal service (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). The 
authors believe this may be tied to individuals who only stayed in service long enough to 
obtain their cliff-vested retirement annuity.  
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Similarly, there does seem to be an indication that older officers with 31 or more 
YOS will return at a slightly lower rate. Since officers retiring at this time would be 53 
years old or older, it suggests there is an age component to the revolving door for older 
field grade officers.  
c. Does Supply and Demand Matter? 
DOD civilian employment fluctuates over time as national security demands and 
the state of the economy dictate. As illustrated in Figure 19, from 2006 to 2015, the DOD 
has grown in response to the combination of the troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
the “Grow the Force Initiative” in 2007. The DOD also shrank in response to the 2009 
recession and sequestration.  
 
Figure 19.  DOD Civilian Employment 2006–2015. Source: S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
New hires continued to fall until 2013. They started to rise again after the civilian 
hiring freeze was lifted in 2013 with sequestration postponement. Figure 20 depicts Army 
new hire trends as compared to the retiring active duty Army force.   
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Due to the immense number of hires in the DOD, the scaling of the chart shows the 
Retiree and Returnee supply lines flatter than they actually are. 
Figure 20.  Army Human Capital Supply and Demand. Adapted from Defense 
Civilian Personnel Advisory Service (2015), S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). 
The difference between the number of retirees and those returning for a second 
civilian career represents a significant population. With higher incentives, some of these 
retiring individuals could help fill additional demand for new hires within the DOD. Note 
that, as shown in Figure 17, if the Army could leverage all its retiring active duty force, it 
could have nearly filled its entire FY2013 new hire requirement. Using retirees could 
lower the transaction costs for the DOD to maintain a well-trained workforce to meet its 
mission requirements. The DOD could hire retirees directly into senior civilian positions 
and avoid years of HC investment and HC exchange needed to build SC in civilian 
leaders. It would leverage the SC present in retirees to maintain functioning 
organizations. 
Another point brought to light by Figure 20 is public misperception about the 
revolving door growth. While the size of the federal government and the DOD decreased 
from 2009 to 2013, the amount of retired military officers returning remained relatively 
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constant. This means military retirees seem like a larger percentage of the DOD 
workforce, even if no additional new retirees were actually hired. What is not shown in 
Figure 20 is the second decline that occurred in 2016 after new hires increased from 2013 
to 2015. Figure 20 was created from DOD Workforce Demographics, which are currently 
posted only through 2015.  
The O-4 to O-6 annual HC recapture pattern evident in Figure 21 follows the 
pattern shown previously in Figure 20. The average DOD contractor HCR3 is 12.6% with 
a 1.17% standard deviation from 2006 to 2016. During the same period, GS civilian 
HCR3 averaged at 25.7% with a 6.77% standard deviation for the same period. We 
calculated the correlation between the total number of O4-O6s returning and the number 
of new civilian hires within the DOD. The factor of 0.83 indicates a strong correlation 
between the total HCR3 and new civilian hires. Within the total recapture group, we 
isolated the number of those hired as GS civilians. Within this narrowed category, the 
correlation factor increases to 0.93 indicating an even stronger relationship. 
 
Figure 21.  Total O-4 – O-6 HC/SC Recapture Rate by Fiscal Year. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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Retired O-4 to O-6s returning to the DOD workforce consistently make up 2–5% 
of total DOD new hires (DOD, 2016a). The 2013 and 2014 returning retiree percentage 
spike outlined in Table 11 can be associated with the Army Officer Separation Boards, 
which forced many soldiers with over 20 years of service to retire earlier than they 
expected. Others without the requisite years of service to retire were given severance 
payments in lieu of retirement annuities. Without much preparation, those being forced to 
retire found faster reemployment by returning to the one thing they had done for over 20 
years. After removing this anomaly, the percentage fluctuates less than 1.5%. 
 Table 11.  Comparison of Army Civilian New Hires against O-4 – O-6s 
Returning to GS Civilian and DOD Contracting Positions. Adapted 
from Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service (2015), 




2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Army Civilian 
New Hires
28783 28490 41842 41808 38979 29464 20668 12608 15891 21218
O4-O6 Returning as 
GS Civilians
544 541 618 670 523 499 432 349 417 414
Percentage of New 
Civilian Hires
1.89% 1.90% 1.48% 1.60% 1.34% 1.69% 2.09% 2.77% 2.62% 1.95%
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Figure 22 presents a more focused viewpoint tracking those who return from 
active duty to either a GS civilian or DOD contracting position. The number of retirees 
returning to the DOD generally follows the number of civilian hires into the DOD by 
fiscal year. There is a visible decline in O-4 to O-6 retirees in the GS civilian workforce. 
In comparison, the DOD contractor workforce shows a slight increase in from 2006 
to 2016. 
 
Figure 22.  Number of Army O-4 – O-6 Retirees Returning as GS Civilians or 
DOD Contractors. Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal 
communication (October 12, 2016). 
It is conceivable if the decline in civilian hires continues, the amount of those returning as 
DOD contractors will outnumber those returning as GS civilians. From a knowledge base 
perspective, the HC and SC is still maintained within the DOD. However, this trend 
might be seen from another perspective, that is, that the DOD knowledge base is leaking 
into the private sector. 
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4. Shrinking Return Time to DOD Second Careers 
The absolute number of retirees returning to the DOD has declined since 2006 
and thus, the amount of HC and SC with it. However, the amount of time which retirees 
take to return is decreasing as well (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 
2016). The HC and SC return dynamic changed in September 2001, when 5 U.S.C.§ 
3326 was suspended, allowing military retirees to return to the DOD as civilians 
immediately after retiring under a national emergency (Obama, 2016). With many skills, 
time degrades proficiency. By allowing retirees to return sooner, the government is able 
to capitalize on perishable HC and SC immediately following retirement. Figure 23 
reflects HC recapture percentages from time of retirement. Figure 23 indicates the 
possibility that the return rate may be larger with the 180-day waiver since there is no 
cooling-off period. Relatively young retirees with families do not have the disincentive of 
waiting six months without a paycheck to return to federal service. 
 
This chart reflects the percentage of those returning to GS Civilian or DOD Contracting 
positions by the timeframe in which they returned after retiring. 
Figure 23.  Percentage of HC Recaptured by Time from Retirement (2006–2016). 
Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication 
(October 12, 2016). 
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Reinstating the 180-day restriction would have a significant impact on the current 
way the DOD recaptures HC and SC. From a time perspective, the HC and SC start to 
degrade as retirees wait six months to return. Many retirees cannot or do not want to wait 
six months for a new job. As observed in Figure 24, more than half those returning in 
under 180 days begin DOD service prior to their retirement date. This may likely be to 
maintain a source of family income. A quickening turnaround from uniformed service to 
civilian service has exaggerated the effect of the “revolving door” as many existing GS 
civilians are working side by side with people in uniform one day and in civilian clothing 
the next.  
 
This chart is a further breakdown of Figure 23 delineating how many retirees are 
returning to the DOD before officially retiring. 
Figure 24.  HC Recaptured by Time from Retirement (2006–2016). Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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From 2006 to 2016, the median return time to a DOD contracting position has 
drastically reduced from over 3,200 days (over 8½ years) to 39 days. This could be in 
part due to the increased use of federal service contracts and lucrative compensation 
packages. GS civilians recently composed over 70% of the returning military population. 
GS median return time has decreased like the return time for DOD contractors but less 
dramatically. The GS median return time from 2006 to 2016 was down from 370 to -6.5 
days (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). The negative median 
illustrated in Figure 25 coupled with the increasing percentage of retirees returning within 
180 days of retirement as indicated in Figure 26 means that many retirees are starting 




Figure 25.  Median Return Time in Days by Fiscal Year. Adapted from 




Figure 26.  Percent of Returnees Returning within 180 Days. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
The trend for faster return to the DOD by retirees poses some questions. Will the 
180-day restriction be reinstated in the near future? If it does, what effect will it have on 
the number of DOD rehires from active duty? What is the DOD doing right to attract 
more people back into service so quickly? And how can the DOD attract more personnel 
to help fill hiring demands? 
B. SECOND CAREER DATA ANALYSIS 
This section details second career trends for returnees. The authors wanted to 
know how the distribution between GS civilians and DOD contractors changed over the 
studied decade. They also looked at second career length trends in both the GS civilian 
and DOD contractor populations. 
1. Second Career Trends for Federal Career Fields 
The nature of returning to federal service after retirement as a GS civilian or a 
DOD contractor has changed over the last decade. As seen in Figure 27, from 2006 until 
2008, most O-4 to O-6 retirees favored becoming a GS civilian. Seventy-three percent of 
the O-4 to O-6 retiree population returned as GS civilians, and only 27% as DOD 
contractors (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). 
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Figure 27.  2006–2008 HCR3 Return Type. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
Over the last decade, this has changed significantly among the retiree population. 
The trend is heading towards an equal distribution between GS civilians and DOD 
contractors. As seen in Figure 28, from 2014 to 2016, the distribution narrowed to 57% 
GS civilians and 43% DOD contractors (S. Seggerman, personal communication, 
October 12, 2016). The authors believe the increase in HC recapture by DOD contractors 
is, in part, due to the DOD’s increased use of service contracts. By using service 
contracts, the DOD can outsource functions that are not inherently government functions. 
Contractors can do jobs formerly reserved for GS employees, and the DOD can benefit 
by shrinking its number of GS employees (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008). Contractors 
represent a significant opportunity to maintain a surge force, which can also contract in 
times of fiscal constraints. 
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Figure 28.  2014–2016 HCR3 Return Type. Adapted from S. Seggerman 
 personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
As previously seen in Figure 22, at the current pace, the number of retirees 
returning as DOD contractors will soon outpace GS civilians. The only thing keeping the 
percent of the workforce swayed in favor of GS civilians is the already existing number 
currently serving.  
Of those that retired, only a very slight percentage retired a second time and came 
back for a third career within the DOD. Eighteen of the 20,503 retired as a DOD 
contractor, and 16 of them came back as GS civilians. The other two went into other 
DOD contracting positions (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). 
Of course, what is not captured in this data is those that retired and went into other forms 
of government service, outside the DOD.  
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2. Second Career Length Trends 
Second career lengths also vary for retired field grade officers. 5,225 of the 5,245 
O-4 to O-6 retirees who returned as GS civilians from 2006 to 2016 are currently 
employed as a GS civilian as of 2016. This 99.7% continued employment rate indicates 
that almost all O-4 to O-6 retirees will stay in a GS position for a lengthy service period 
after they retire from military service. 2,305 of the 2,578 O-4 to O-6 retirees who 
returned as DOD contractors from 2006 to 2016 are currently employed as DOD 
contractors as of 2016. The 89.4% continued employment rate indicates a lower, but still 
significant second career loyalty to the DOD (S. Seggerman, personal communication, 
October 12, 2016). 
For the 20 GS civilians who left service again, the average time as a GS civilian 
was just over 3½ years. Of the 273 DOD contractors who left service again, the average 
time of service as a DOD contractor was slightly over 1½ years. Both of these numbers 
seem exceptionally short when the median time to retirement is not considered. The 
median time for second career service as a GS civilian was slightly over four years, and 
for DOD contracting, it actually shortens to slightly over one year. In an interesting twist, 
1.5% of DOD contractors who left their contractor positions became GS civilians. In 
contrast, zero GS civilians left their positions to become DOD contractors. This seems to 
indicate that a small number of retirees first join a DOD contractor and then wait to 
compete for GS positions that subsequently become available (S. Seggerman, personal 
communication, October 12, 2016). 
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter details seven project findings based on the analyzed data. It draws on 
these findings to highlight five conclusions about the revolving door in the DOD. The 
authors used available Army retirement data to approximate the DOD military retirement 
and civilian hiring trends from 2006 to 2016. 
A. FINDINGS 
The HCR3 for mid-grade retired officers is strongly correlated to the DOD hiring 
needs. O-4 to O-6 retirees return to the Army GS sector by a correlation factor of .93 to 
new civilian hires (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). This 
strong correlation indicates retired officers are hired proportionally to hiring needs within 
the Army from 2006 to 2016. 
The revolving door for mid-grade retired officers is small. Retired O-4 to O-6 
officers represent, on average, 1.93% of new GS hires within the Army from 2006 to 
2016 (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). Even at its lowest 
point in that timeframe, the Army hired over 12,000 new civilians in a single year. 
Whether it is growing, shrinking, or under a hiring freeze, the Army and the larger DOD 
requires a constant HC influx. On average, O-4 to O-6 retirees tend to make up under two 
percent of Army GS civilian new hires in any given year. This does not represent a 
significant threat to DOD hiring or promotion rates for non-second career new hires. 
Thus, the revolving door as an unfair and deceitful practice is an idea that seems to 
capture more attention than it warrants.  
The authors found that very few barriers to DOD re-employment remain in 
comparison to pre-2001 when the 180 - day restriction was in place or the early 1990s 
when there was a financial offset to return to federal service. Today, retired officers can 
leave their military position one day and return the next as a civilian. Often, they continue 
working in the same organization with the same group of co-workers. There is also no 
financial offset for officers who retire and return to service. Retired officers receive their 
full civilian paycheck and their full retirement paycheck concurrently in their new 
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position. With no restrictions on return time and no offset, officers face few barriers to 
continued service as a GS civilian or DOD contractor. 
Even with low barriers to re-employment, DOD realizes a 30-40% HCR3 for the 
mid-grade officer population. The remaining 60-70% of retired mid-grade officers enter 
second careers for which it is difficult to obtain data or simply permanently retire from 
the workforce. The 2016 DOD return rate is predicted to be below 30 percent based on 
the data available to the researchers. This low re-employment rate indicates the DOD is 
losing a significant amount of HC and SC and not maximizing its possible return.  
Those mid-grade officers who were re-employed as either a GS civilian or a DOD 
contractor returned to the DOD progressively faster from 2006 to 2016. Nearly half of 
total HC recapture occurred within 180 days of retirement. Over half of retirees returning 
within 180 days became re-employed in the DOD while on terminal leave. This indicates 
that over half of retiring mid-grade officers entering the GS workforce do so before they 
formally retire from uniformed service. The authors predict that over 50% of total HC 
recapture will soon occur within 180 days of retirement if the current trend toward faster 
re-employment continues (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016).  
While the GS civilian re-employment rate fell from 2006 to 2016, the DOD 
contractor re-employment rate rose. The O-4, O-5, and O-6 GS civilian re-employment 
rate fell from 32%, 31%, and 23% respectively in 2006 to 14%, 14%, and 16% 
respectively in 2016. Meanwhile, the O-4, O-5, and O-6 DOD contractor re-employment 
rate rose from 9%, 12%, and 10% respectively in 2006 to 13%, 14%, and 14% 
respectively in 2016 (S. Seggerman, personal communication, October 12, 2016). Within 
the O-4 to O-6 retiree pool DOD contracting is likely to become the preferred venue for 
second career employment. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Contrary to popular belief, there is no mid-grade officer revolving door problem 
in the DOD. The revolving door is small compared to the DOD’s overall size. The Army 
employed over 248,000 GS civilians in 2016 (DMDC, 2016). Approximately 2,000 mid-
grade Army officers retire each year. (S. Seggerman, Personal Communication, October 
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12, 2016). Annual revolving door hires make up less than 0.8% of the total Army GS 
workforce. On average, fewer than 2% of annual new GS civilian hires are attributable to 
mid-grade officer revolving door re-employment. This is hardly the unfair widespread 
double dipping scheme alleged by policy makers, the media, and activist policy groups. A 
few high profile retiree ethical lapses have exaggerated the negative public perception of 
the revolving door.  
Policy makers, the media, and activist groups continue to focus on the cost of the 
revolving door. However, these groups ignore the value of HC and SC recapture and 
reuse resulting from the revolving door. Instead of the revolving door being an abusive 
practice, it is actually an underutilized and valuable tool for the DOD to maintain its 
competitive edge in national defense. The revolving door is an efficient way for DOD to 
retain critical skills and lower its long term HC costs. Retired mid-grade officers possess 
a significant amount of education, training, and experience regardless of the method used 
to measure it; and they have an established social network that enables them to 
immediately operate effectively in middle and upper echelon DOD management. It is 
entirely possible that the DOD and public policy experts have not considered the full 
benefit of rehiring highly qualified military retirees in order to preserve organizational 
effectiveness through HC and SC recapture and reuse. 
Reestablishing the 180-day cooling off period would be a disincentive for retired 
mid-grade officers to return to DOD as a GS civilian. Reinstating a financial offset for 
retirees re-employed as GS civilians would be a further disincentive to return to DOD. 
These two actions would reduce DOD’s HCR3 rate and increase DOD’s HC costs to 
maintain a professional civilian workforce. The removal of the 180-day cooling off 
period allows a more rapid HCR3 return for the DOD and limits organizational 
disruptions due to personnel transitions. The current immediate return practice allows 
DOD to maintain its social networks and gives retirees a seamless transfer from active 
duty to civilian federal service.  
Without increased incentives to cast a larger net and capture additional HC from 
this pool of officers, the return rate will likely continue to average between 30 to 40 
percent of retirees. Current initiatives to reduce or eliminate the revolving door may 
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inadvertently cause the DOD to experience a greater HC crisis than necessary as the baby 
boom generation nears retirement and DOD seeks to fill critical knowledge gaps. 
The data indicates DOD reliance on contractors will continue to grow and the 
revolving door will absorb a larger percentage of retirees. This conclusion is in keeping 
with DOD trends to outsource more requirements through service contracts. Inherently 
Governmental Functions (IGF) will continue to be performed by GS employees since 
those positions cannot legally be contracted out. With this in mind, it is reasonable to 




VI. RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter draws on the findings and conclusions outlined in Chapter V to make 
three public policy recommendations. It details project limitations and offers five areas 
for future research. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The authors recommend policy makers continue the revolving door practice and 
maintain the immediate return practice. Current practices to rehire retired officers 
maximize the return potential and realize a 30–40% recapture rate. However, policy 
makers need to balance this approach with safeguards in place to maintain transparency, 
equity, and oversight.  
To eliminate the perception of double-dipping, the immediate return practice 
should be modified to ensure retirees start their new civilian position after terminal leave 
ends. While on terminal leave, they are essentially a uniformed service member with a 
side job. Once terminal leave ends, retirees are officially civilians. Retirees should be 
allowed to return the day after they officially retire in order to recapture their HC and SC 
as quickly as possible. 
Lastly, the DOD needs to monitor the current trend of retirees returning as DOD 
contractors. If this trend continues, the government stands at risk of having a majority of 
its HC investment crossed over to the private sector. This puts the government in 
jeopardy of not being able to do the work it typically performs. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
Researchers were limited by information availability and Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) restrictions for academic research in this study. Attempts to study 
second career trends outside the DOD met legal review roadblock delays and caused 
project scope changes to eliminate PII encounters.  
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Cataloguing techniques at other federal agencies, state and local governments, and 
the public sector made data outside the DOD difficult to find and use. When federal, 
state, and local government agencies do report their retired military second career 
workforce, they track them as “employed annuitants” and do not break them down into 
retired rank bands. Private sector employers are also under no obligation to track or 
report their retired military workforce, making reliable data difficult to obtain. 
Time limitations for MBA report research and writing also created challenges to 
the researchers. It took nearly three months to craft the project in a manner that would 
receive Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. 
The researchers attempted to use the PII de-identified Personal-event Database 
Environment (PDE) Database to study their target audience. PDE access required an 
additional month with additional review and approval layers. Ultimately, the duplicate 
data sets caused by multiple personnel system feeds made using PDE a cumbersome and 
unreliable database for this project.  
Any future studies should take into account the difficulty obtaining reliable data 
without violating PII restrictions. Future researchers will also need to take into account 
different agency data collection procedures to ensure they receive accurate data. They 
should also begin planning their methodology as early as possible to obtain IRB approval 
and avoid PII restrictions. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One area for future research is an enlisted retiree revolving door analysis. Enlisted 
retirees represent approximately half of military retirements. Like its officer force, DOD 
makes a significant HC investment across its enlisted force over the course of a 20 to 30 
year career. A revolving door study similar to this project would help determine the size, 
shape, and impact of enlisted retirees to DOD HCR3.  
A second area could focus on the DOD revolving door impact from separated, 
non-retired service members. Only 15.7% of non-disabled service members reach 
retirement eligibility. The 82.3% who leave service before retirement also receive large 
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HC investments from DOD. A revolving door study similar to this project would help 
determine the size, shape, and impact of separated non-retirees to DOD HCR3. 
A third area could include the DOD revolving door impact from disabled retirees. 
With continued conflict involvement in multiple theaters of operation, there is a growing 
number of service members who are medically retired. While they cannot remain in 
uniformed service, some are capable of and choose to return to DOD service as a GS 
civilian or DOD contractor. A revolving door study similar to this project would help 
determine the size, shape, and impact of disabled retirees to DOD HCR3. 
Another area is DOD retiree entrepreneurs. While these retirees do not necessarily 
return HCR3 to DOD, they do represent an economic value to the United States. They 
bring valuable skill sets and perspectives to the businesses or organizations they run. 
Determining the size of the entrepreneur force and the types of organizations they start 
would add to the body of knowledge about retired military second careers. 
A final area of possible research would include DOD retirees transitioning to state 
and local agencies. While these retirees do not necessarily return HCR3 to DOD, they do 
represent an economic gain to state and local governments. They bring a valuable skill set 
and perspective which are not readily available in the general public. 
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APPENDIX A.  MILITARY RETIREMENT DEFINED BENEFIT 
VALUE 
Military retirements aim to give retirees compensation for their service and 
sacrifices over a career. The Defined Benefit plans and retirement structure have changed 
little since World War II. Today’s military retirees will fall into one of three retirement 
plans based on date of service entry. They will be subject to either the Traditional, High-
3, or the CSB/REDUX plan. The Blended Retirement Plan starts in 2018 and is available 
to service members with less than 12 years of service. Individuals entering active duty 
after January 1, 2018, will be subject to the Blended Retirement Plan. Retirees can expect 
different payouts under their various multiplier rates and methods. The multiplier rates 
for each plan are detailed in Table 12. A retiree can expect to receive the multiplier 
percentage of his or her basic pay as his or her retirement annuity. 
 Table 12.  Basic Pay Multiplier for Current Military Retirement System. 
Adapted from “Military Compensation” (n.d.). 
 
 
As indicated by Tables 13, 14, and 15, military retirement benefits have slowly 
declined in their generosity. Service members will soon be asked for more financial input 
to their own retirement. This is in general keeping with the trend in the private 
marketplace. 
a. Traditional 
The Traditional military retirement system applies to personnel who entered 
service before September 8, 1980. A service member is entitled to 2.5% of his or her final 
pay for every year of service. Under this system, a member who retires at 20 years of 
Years of 
Service
20 21 22 23 24 25 30
 Final Pay 50% 52.50% 55% 57.50% 60% 62.50% 75%
 High-3 50% 52.50% 55% 57.50% 60% 62.50% 75%
 REDUX 40% 43.50% 47% 50.50% 54% 57.50% 75%
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service will receive 50% of his or her final pay starting at their retirement date. A 
member who remains in service until 30 years of service will receive 75% of his or her 
final pay per month starting at the retirement date. The retirement annuity begins 
payment immediately after their retirement date and lasts the remainder of the member’s 
lifetime. Retirement pay is based on a member’s basic pay without additional allowances 
or career field bonuses. Table 13 depicts what a retiree would expect to receive in 
retirement pay under the Traditional Retirement Plan and the plan’s Net Present Value 
(NPV). 
 Table 13.  Traditional Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. 




The High-3 system applies to service members who joined service between 
September 8, 1980, and July 31, 1986. It also applies to service members who joined 
service after July 31, 1986, who opt not to accept the 15-year Career Status Bonus (CSB). 
Under this system, a member who retires at 20 years of service will receive 50% of his or 
her average final three years of pay starting at his or her retirement date. A member who 
remains in service until 30 years of service will receive 75% of his or her average final 
three years of pay per month starting at his or her retirement date. The retirement annuity 
begins payment immediately after the retirement date and lasts the remainder of the 
individual’s lifetime. Like the Traditional Retirement Plan, retired pay is based on a 
member’s basic pay without additional allowances or career field bonuses. Table 14 
depicts what a retiree would expect to receive in retirement pay under the High-3 
Retirement Plan and the plan’s NPV. 







O-5 20 $8,617.20 $4,308.60 $51,703.20 $1,292,580.00
O-5 23.6 $8,876.40 $5,103.93 $61,247.16 $1,531,179.00
O-6 30 $11,094.90 $8,321.18 $99,854.10 $2,496,352.50
Traditional
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 Table 14.  High-3 Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. Adapted 




The 1986 Military Retirement Reform Act (Redux) established a one-time 
$30,000 bonus for service members at their 15-year service mark. In exchange for the 
$30,000, service members accept a lower multiplier rate at any point lower than 30 years 
of service when compared to the Traditional or High-3 plans. A member who accepts the 
CSB accepts a 2% multiplier up to 20 years of service instead of the 2.5% multiplier 
under the High-3 system. A service member who retires at 20 years under CSB/REDUX 
will receive 40% of his or her highest three years of pay. From 20 years to 30 years of 
service, service members recoup a larger percentage of their retired multiplier factor than 
in the High-3 plan. Under CSB/REDUX, a service member will accrue a 3.5% per year 
multiplier rate until they meet their maximum at 30 years with 75% basic pay retirement. 
Table 15 depicts what a retiree would expect to receive per month in retirement pay 
under the CSB/REDUX Retirement Plan. 
 Table 15.  CSB/REDUX Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. 
Adapted from DFAS (n.d.), “Military Compensation” (n.d.). 
 







O-5 20 $8,617.20 $4,232.50 $50,790.00 $1,269,750.00
O-5 23.6 $8,876.40 $5,054.25 $60,651.00 $1,516,275.00
O-6 30 $11,094.90 $8,212.58 $98,550.90 $2,463,772.50
High-3







O-5 20 $8,617.20 $3,386.00 $40,632.00 $1,015,800.00
O-5 23.6 $8,876.40 $4,438.95 $53,267.40 $1,331,685.00




January 1, 2018, will usher in the new Blended Retirement System. Under this 
system, service members will receive Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) matching funds, in 
addition to accruing a reduced defined plan for those staying until retirement. The TSP 
acts like a civilian 401(k) or 403(b) employee contribution retirement plan. They will also 
accrue a reduced Defined Annuity Benefit retirement at 2% per year under the new plan 
instead of the 2.5% accrued under the Traditional and High-3 plans. Under the new plan, 
service members will receive 40% of their highest three years of pay if they stay to 20 
years. Table 16 outlines the Defined Benefit portion of the Blended Retirement that a 
future retiree could expect in 2016 dollars. 
 Table 16.  Blended Retirement Plan Monthly Annuity Expectation. 
Adapted from DOD (2016b). 
 
 
As detailed in Figure 29 the main benefit to the Blended Retirement System is to 
the 83% of service members who do not stay until the 20-year retirement time. Those 
service members will be eligible to keep their TSP savings, including those accrued by 
the government matching funds after they have served a minimum of two years. 







O-5 20 $8,617.20 $3,386.00 $40,632.00 $1,015,800.00
O-5 23.6 $8,876.40 $4,043.40 $48,520.80 $1,213,020.00




Figure 29.  Blended Retirement System Overview. Source: DOD (2016b). 
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APPENDIX B.  RECAPTURING HC BY RANK AND YEAR 
 
Figure 30.  O-4 HCR3 by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
 
Figure 31.  O-5 HCR3 by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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Figure 32.  O-6 HCR3 by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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APPENDIX C.  SHORTENING RETIREE RETURN TIME 
 
Figure 33.  O-4 Median Return Time (Days) by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
 
Figure 34.  O-5 Median Return Time (Days) by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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Figure 35.  O-6 Median Return Time (Days) by FY. Adapted from S. Seggerman, 
personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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APPENDIX D.  AGE AND YEARS OF SERVICE TRENDS 
 
Figure 36.  Retirees Returning to DOD before Separation Date by YOS. Adapted 
from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
 
Figure 37.  Retirees Returning to DOD before 180 Days by YOS. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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Figure 38.  Retirees Returning to DOD between 180 Days and 1 Year by YOS. 
Adapted from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 
2016). 
 
Figure 39.  Retirees Returning to DOD between 1 and 2 Years by YOS. Adapted 
from S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
 87 
 
Figure 40.  Retirees Returning to DOD after 2 Years by YOS. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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APPENDIX E.  PERCENT OF RETIREES BY RANK 
 
Figure 41.  Percent of Returnees by Rank and Return Type in 2006. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
 
Figure 42.  Percent of Returnees by Rank and Return Type in 2016. Adapted from 
S. Seggerman, personal communication (October 12, 2016). 
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SUPPLEMENTAL.  EXCEL DATA DEPICTING 2006-2016 ARMY 
MID-GRADE OFFICER RETIREES RE-EMPLOYMENT TRENDS 
This separate supplemental data set lists Army mid-grade officer retirements 
from 2006 to 2016. Data includes all Active Duty officers who retired with 20 or 
more years of service. The raw data set was provided by DMDC in October, 2016. All 
data provided was current at that time. This data set also lists Army GS civilian hires 
and DOD contractors with valid common access card identification. Data set 
formatting allowed the authors to determine O-4 to O-6 Army officer retirement trends 
and their return rates to the Army as either GS civilians or DOD contractors.  
Any individual interested in obtaining the supplemental data set should contact 
the Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library for assistance. 
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